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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
LITIGATION: PROOF OF CONCEPT
FOR THE MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION AND THE 2015
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
John C. Cruden, Steve O’Rourke & Sarah D. Himmelhoch*
ABSTRACT**
On April 20, 2010, the oil rig Deepwater Horizon exploded in the Gulf of
Mexico, killing eleven people and injuring seventeen more.  Efforts to stop the
spill failed.  For the next eighty-seven days, hundreds of millions of barrels of oil
poured into the Gulf.  This catastrophe not only changed the lives of the families
of the dead and injured and the communities who experienced the economic and
social disruption of the spill – it challenged the survival of the ecosystem of the
ninth largest water body in the world.  The oil spill extended fifty miles offshore
from Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico and spread over an area larger than the
State of Idaho.  The oil spill also triggered the onset of one of the most significant
civil environmental enforcement actions in the history of our nation.  This Article
is written by counsel for the Department of Justice’s civil enforcement case in
response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  After examining the litigation of
the case from inception through settlement, this article explores the lessons learned
from the litigation and the premise that this case demonstrates a proof of concept
for the effectiveness of cooperative federalism, the Manual for Complex Litigation
and the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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I. OVERVIEW
On April 20, 2010, the oil rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico
exploded and caught fire, resulting in the death of eleven individuals and
injuries to seventeen more.1  The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was owned
by Transocean Ltd., who contracted to drill for BP.2  For eighty-seven days,
1. See generally NAT’L CO M M’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 3–19 (2011) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT].  For information regarding
the eleven men whose lives were cut short, see Steve Joynt, Oil Spill Day 100: The 11 Men
Who Died on the Deepwater Horizon, ALABAMA.COM (July 28 2010, 5:00 AM), http://blog.al
.com/live/2010/07/oil_spill_day_100_the_11_men_w.html.
2. As used in this article, the term “BP” refers to the family of corporations involved
in the exploration of the Macondo well and the response to the massive oil spill.  As was
discussed at length in the third trial held in the multidistrict litigation (MDL), the BP
entities operate through a series of corporate entities that are closely intertwined and for
purposes of this article are indistinguishable. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial at 1014:12–21, In re
Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2015).  The details of the relationship be-
tween BP and Transocean are explained in the court’s ruling on the first phase of trial. See In
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the nation watched in anguish as over three million barrels of oil poured
into the Gulf3 and numerous efforts to stop the spill failed.4
On June 15, 2010, President Barack Obama addressed the nation about
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, saying: “We will fight this spill with every-
thing we’ve got for as long as it takes.  We will make BP pay for the damage
their company has caused.  And we will do whatever’s necessary to help the
Gulf Coast and its people recover from this tragedy.”5  Six years later, At-
torney General Loretta Lynch announced a settlement that she described as
the largest such settlement with a single defendant in the history of the
Department of Justice.6
This article, prepared by the litigation counsel and the Assistant Attor-
ney General who led the settlement discussions, reviews this civil enforce-
ment case from its inception to settlement.7  The litigation resulted in over
500 days of deposition, more than 100 expert reports, three trials, several
appeals to the Fifth Circuit, multiple petitions to the Supreme Court, the
management of terabytes of information, numerous case management or-
ders, document management decisions, the application of the Manual for
Complex Litigation, and the highly effective use of magistrate judges and
special masters.
The article traces the key events in the oil spill and subsequent litiga-
tion as relevant to civil environmental enforcement in particular and as rele-
vant to the litigation of any mass tort case in general.  As this is the largest
oil spill in the history of the United States, and one of the most extensive
and far-reaching settlement agreements of its kind, it is worthy of study
simply for the extraordinarily detailed environmental restoration that is
both envisioned and funded.  This case is also worth study as one of the
best examples of a district court using the Manual for Complex Litigation
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010
[hereinafter In re Oil Spill], 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 668–69 (E.D. La. 2014).
3. See In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 525 ¶ 277 (E.D. La. 2014) (finding that 4
million barrels of oil were released into the Gulf but only considering 3.19 million barrels for
civil penalties).  By way of comparison, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 257,000 bar-
rels. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 569 ¶ 32 (E.D. La. 2015).
4. See In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 508–513 ¶¶ 68–196.
5. President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15,
2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill.
6. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Lynch, Federal Partners Announce Settlement
with BP on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, YOUTUBE, at 2:53–3:08 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=4jfDLNyIWis.
7. The authors of this article witnessed or participated in many of the events and
decisions described in this article, particularly those related to trial and litigation.  State-
ments describing events that are not accompanied by references to specific sources are based
upon the personal knowledge of the authors.
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and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to manage litigation.  This litiga-
tion served as proof of concept for two central themes of the Manual for
Complex Litigation and the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: (a) the need for active judicial management and supervision and
(b) the responsibility of all counsel to work toward the “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”8  The successful
implementation of these principles demonstrates that successful enforce-
ment is feasible even when the stakes are as high as they were after the
nation’s largest oil spill.
II. THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
In 2008, BP leased, from the Department of the Interior, development
rights for Mississippi Canyon Block 252 in the Gulf of Mexico.9  The plan
was to drill a well—to be named the Macondo well10—about 50 miles off the
coast of Louisiana, where the ocean is a mile deep.11  The oil was expected
to be found two miles below the sea floor (three miles below the ocean’s
surface).12  BP entered into co-lessee agreements with Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation and MOEX Offshore 2007 that designated BP as the “opera-
tor” of the Macondo well—a term with legal significance that will be dis-
cussed below.13
BP then contracted with various Transocean entities for operation of a
mobile offshore drilling unit.14  By February, 2010, Transocean’s Deepwater
Horizon was drilling the deep-water Macondo well on the leased block.15
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
9. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 671 (E.D. La. 2014).  The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act establishes the framework for offshore drilling and extends the jurisdiction
of the United States to the outer continental shelf regarding oil exploration and production.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).  The Department of the Interior promulgated regulations gov-
erning drilling activities, which were in effect at the time of the Deepwater Horizon inci-
dent. 30 C.F.R. pt. 250 (2016).
10. Macondo is the name of a fictional town in One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel
Garc´ıa Ma´rquez.
11. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 671 ¶ 45.
12. See id. at 673 ¶ 47.
13. See In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d 756, 747–48 (E.D. La. 2010).
14. Id.  A mobile offshore drilling unit is exactly what its name implies – a vessel that
can move from location to location and that when it arrives at the location of a well to be
drilled, becomes a fully operational, and temporarily stationary, drilling platform. See 33
U.S.C. § 2701(18) (2012).
15. BP’s other contractors included Halliburton for the cement job and M-I Swaco as
the drilling mud contractor. See In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 669 ¶¶ 26–30.  Cameron
had manufactured the Blowout Preventer. Id. at 669 ¶ 27.  These companies were each
defendants in private party cases; the United States did not sue any of them.
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At the outset of the drilling, BP had identified a subsea blowout—i.e.,
an uncontrolled discharge of oil16—as one of the highest risks for the com-
pany associated with the Macondo well.17  As described by the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
the primary defense against a blowout is to apply pressure (in the form of a
heavy fluid) to control hydrocarbons:
The principal challenge in deepwater drilling is to drill a path to
the hydrocarbon-filled pay zone in a manner that simultaneously
controls these enormous pressures [from the weight of the rocks
above a pay zone] and avoids fracturing the geologic formation in
which the reservoir is found. It is a delicate balance.  The drillers
must balance the reservoir pressure (pore pressure) pushing hydro-
carbons into the well with counter-pressure from inside the
wellbore.  If too much counter-pressure is used, the formation can
be fractured.  But if too little counter-pressure is used, the result
can be an uncontrolled intrusion of hydrocarbons into the well, and
a discharge from the well itself as the oil and gas rush up and out of
the well.18
There are many other safety measures used to prevent a blowout, but at
the onset of drilling by the Deepwater Horizon, BP had identified the blow-
out preventer as the “last line of defense.”19  This piece of equipment, which
weighed 400 tons, comprised a series of valves intended to close the well
and prevent the escape of oil, including in the event that the drilling team
lost control of the well.20
Drilling at the Macondo well continued through April 20, 2010.21  At
that time, the drilling had reached final depth.22  While the Deepwater Hori-
zon was appropriate as a drilling rig, “BP, like most operators, would give
the job of ‘completing’ the well to a smaller (and less costly) rig.”23  As the
National Commission stated, “To make way for the new rig, the Deepwater
Horizon would have to remove its riser and blowout preventer from the
16. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 90–91.
17. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 517 ¶ 221 (E.D. La. 2014) (“As Dr. Tony
Hayward, the Group CEO of BP p.l.c. at the time of the blowout, explained, BP had identi-
fied a subsea deepwater blowout as one of the highest risks for the company.”).
18. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 90–91.
19. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 517 ¶ 221.
20. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 92–93.
21. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 675 ¶¶ 73–74 (E.D. La. 2014).
22. Id.
23. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 103.
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wellhead—and before it could do those things, the crew had to secure the
well through a process called ‘temporary abandonment.’ ”24
To seal the well and complete the temporary abandonment, BP had to
(1) cement the bottom of the well, (2) perform a test known as a negative
pressure test to make sure the plug had sealed the well, (3) remove the
drilling mud from the casing, and (4) set a second cement plug in place.25
On the evening of April 20, 2010, BP had reviewed the results of the nega-
tive pressure test and concluded that it was safe to remove the drilling mud
and set the second plug.26  That conclusion, however, proved catastrophi-
cally careless.  During the process of removing the drilling mud, there was
an uncontrolled blowout of oil and gas from the well.27
The cause of the blowout was hotly disputed and the subject of the first
trial, which will be discussed below.  The complex technical questions ad-
dressed in that trial are beyond the scope of this article, but in a simplified
summary, the court focused on the importance of the negative pressure test:
The negative pressure test, however, was a particularly critical part
of the temporary abandonment operation.  As previously explained,
the negative pressure test is a safety-critical test.  Its purpose was
to determine whether the cement and casing had successfully iso-
lated the well from the reservoir, so that the heavy drilling mud—
which otherwise prevented hydrocarbons from flowing into the
well—could be safely removed.28
The court then found that BP went forward with attempts to remove the
drilling mud and install the second plug well despite “squirrely” results from
the negative pressure test.29
In addition, the court found that BP engaged in a series of decisions
that added risks to the cement job and the negative pressure test, including
the decision to use fewer centralizers.30  Similarly, BP decided not to per-
24. Id.
25. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 675–76 ¶ 75.
26. Id. at 676 ¶ 76.
27. Id. at 666–67 ¶¶ 2–7.
28. Id. at 738–39 ¶ 503.
29. Id. at 705–06 ¶¶ 266–77, 741 ¶ 511; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 106–14.
30. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 740–41 ¶ 510.  Centralizers are critical components
in ensuring a good cement job.  When a casing string hangs in the center of the wellbore,
cement pumped down the casing will flow evenly back up the annulus, displacing any mud
and debris that were previously in that space and leaving a clean column of cement.  If the
casing is not centered, the cement will flow preferentially up the path of least resistance—the
larger spaces in the annulus—and slowly or not at all in the narrower annular space.  That can
leave behind channels of drilling mud that can severely compromise a primary cement job by
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form a full “bottoms up” circulation.31  Ideally, BP would have “pumped
enough mud down the wellbore to bring mud originally at the bottom of the
well all the way back up to the rig.”32  The decision not to do this procedure
increased the risk of cement channeling or contamination of the cement.33
Other decisions also contributed to the risks of a poor cementing job and a
blowout, including the decision “to pump a low volume of cement, which
increased the risk that cement would not be placed appropriately”;34 the
decision to use a particular kind of cement without first checking its stabil-
ity, which increased the risk of cement failure; the decision to pump the
cement at a low rate in a synthetic oil based mud environment, which in-
creased the risk of cement contamination; the decision not to perform a
cement bond log following the cement job, which required BP to rely upon
the “squirrely” negative pressure results;35 and the decision to use an “unor-
thodox” spacer to separate the drilling mud from the seawater, which in-
creased the risk that the openings in the blowout preventer would be
clogged.36  As the court stated:
While not all of these decisions may have contributed to the ulti-
mate mode of failure, and perhaps not all were necessarily unrea-
sonable decisions (at least when viewed in isolation), each of these
decisions and their associated risks should have increased the cau-
tion surrounding the negative pressure test beyond the “high alert”
status it already demanded.37
BP, however, did not increase its caution and accepted the results of the
negative pressure test, causing a blowout and resulting explosions and
fires.38  This carelessness caused the death of eleven crewmen and seriously
creating paths and gaps through which pressurized hydrocarbons can flow. REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 96.
31. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 740 ¶ 510.
32. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 100.
33. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 740 ¶ 510.
34. Id.
35. Id.  A cement bond log tests the integrity of cement in the annular space around
the casing and formation, and the location and severity of any channels though the cement.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 102.
36. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 740–41 ¶ 510.  The spacer is a liquid mixture that
separates the heavy drilling mud from the seawater.  Drilling crews routinely use water-
based spacers, BP directed M-I Swaco mud engineers to create a spacer out of left-over
materials on the rig that otherwise would have to have been disposed of as hazardous waste.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 106.
37. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 741 ¶ 510.
38. Id. at 703 ¶ 251.
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injured seventeen others.39  Oil began flowing into the Gulf.40  On April
22, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon sank to the ocean bottom, but the well, well
equipment, and blowout preventer continued to discharge oil into the Gulf
of Mexico until July 15, 2010.41
III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE EXPLOSION
A. The Organization of a Massive Response
From the very moment it received word of the explosion, the Coast
Guard was in action – rescuing individuals and taking control of the re-
moval action.42  The rescue operation alone was massive.  As Admiral Allen
stated, the Coast Guard engaged in “an extraordinary search and rescue
case, where over 90 people were evacuated and three were critically injured
and evacuated by Coast Guard helicopters.”43  The initial rescues were fol-
lowed by “three intensive days of searches of nearly 30 aircraft and vessel
sorties, over 5,000 square miles searched.”44  By April 22, 2010, the Coast
Guard transitioned from solely a rescue and recovery operation to an oil
spill response.
Oil spill response under the Clean Water Act and Oil Pollution Act is
governed by the National Contingency Plan.45  The National Contingency
39. Id. at 667 ¶ 3.
40. Id. at 667 ¶ 6.
41. Id. at 667 ¶¶ 5–7.  Some of the plaintiffs asserted that the rig sank because six ships
that came to the rig’s assistance used water hoses in an attempt to put out the fire aboard the
rig.  They claimed that as these six ships “continued to blast water onto the rig, its upper
compartments began to fill, resulting in a shift in the center of gravity of the rig,” ultimately
causing the rig to sink. See In re Oil Spill, No. 2179, 2011 WL 4829905, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct.
12, 2011).  The court rejected the claims, finding:
[A] reasonable person in Defendants; situation would not foresee that spraying
water from one vessel onto another vessel in apparent hopes of extinguishing a fire
would cause oil to discharge continuously from the latter vessel’s drill pipe, which
would probably result in the economic and property damages allegedly incurred by
onshore Plaintiffs over fifty miles away.
Id. at *6.
42. Transcript of Press Briefing by Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen, and Assis-
tant to the President for Homeland Security John Brennan on Ongoing Response to Oil




45. See 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (2012) (authorizing expenditure from the oil spill trust fund
for costs that are “consistent with the National Contingency Plan”); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(3)
(2012) (“Each Federal agency, State, owner or operator, or other person participating in
efforts under this subsection shall act in accordance with the National Contingency
Plan . . . .”).  The National Contingency Plan is found at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2016).
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Plan organizes oil spill response using the Incident Command System, an
expandable management structure designed to ensure that resources and
personnel are used efficiently.46
Recognizing that the responsible party must perform the cleanup and
that any cleanup must be closely supervised, the Incident Command System
operates on the concept of “unified command.”47  For offshore oil spills,
such as the Deepwater Horizon spill, a member of the United States Coast
Guard is appointed the Federal On-Scene Coordinator to run removal ac-
tions for off-shore oil spills.48  The Federal On-Scene Coordinator approves
and selects the response actions, which are then performed by the responsi-
ble party in coordination with representatives from other federal agencies,
as well as state and local agencies.49
Because it was apparent early on that this spill represented a threat of
massive geographical scope, the Coast Guard began implementing the most
46. Transcript of Trial at 75:02–13, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan.
20, 2015).  Because of the national scope of this disaster, efforts to coordinate the response
were also governed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. In re Oil Spill, 77 F.
Supp. 3d 500, 507 ¶ 48 (E.D. La. 2014).
47. See Captain Laferriere Deposition at 259:01–05, 264:14–24, 265:01–06, In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Laferriere Deposition]; Tran-
script of Trial, supra note 46, at 125:04-125:06.  The concept of unified command is also R
reflected in the fact that “parties rendering care, assistance, or advice consistent with the
National Contingency Plan or as directed by the President (or his designee) are explicitly
immunized from removal costs or damages that result from their actions or omissions.” In re
Oil Spill, No. 2179, 2012 WL 5960192, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2012) (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(c)(4)(A) (2012)).  This derivative sovereign immunity is designed to encourage par-
ticipation in cleanup efforts and compliance with directives of the Federal On-Scene Coordi-
nator. Id. (quoting H.R. REP . NO. 101-653, at 45 (1990)).  In the Deepwater Horizon
litigation, the Court found that sovereign immunity protected the manufacturer of the dis-
persants from personal injury claims arising from exposure to the dispersants because this
clause of the Clean Water Act preempted claims for personal injury under state or General
Maritime law. Id. at *21.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (2012) (“The President shall, in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan . . . ensure effective and immediate removal of a discharge . . . .”); Exec.
Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757, 54,758 (Oct. 18, 1991) (“The functions vested in the
President by Section 311(c) of FWPCA and Section 1011 of OPA, respecting an effective and
immediate removal or arrangement for removal of a discharge and mitigation or prevention
of a substantial threat of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance, the direction and moni-
toring of all Federal, State and private actions, the removal and destruction of a vessel, the
issuance of directions, consulting with affected trustees, and removal completion determina-
tions, are delegated to the Administrator for the inland zone and to the Secretary of the
Department in which the Coast Guard is operating for the coastal zone.”).
49. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2016) (“On-scene coordinator (OSC) means the federal
official predesignated by EPA or the USCG to coordinate and direct responses under sub-
part D, or the government official designated by the lead agency to coordinate and direct
removal actions under subpart E of the NCP.”).
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complex application of the Incident Control System in American history.50
For the first time, the United States declared a Spill of National Signifi-
cance.51  In other words, very early on, the Coast Guard recognized that this
spill was one that “due to its severity, size, location, actual or potential im-
pact on the public health and welfare or the environment, or the necessary
response effort, is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of
federal, state, local, and responsible party resources to contain and clean up
the discharge.”52  Having declared the spill one of national significance, the
Coast Guard took the next logical step and created a National Incident
Command, located in Washington, D.C.53  The National Incident Com-
mand coordinated the “whole of government” response—taking responsibil-
ity for advising the President of the status of the response, coordinating
with agencies not typically part of the Incident Command System, and ad-
dressing national political issues such as obtaining resources from outside of
the Gulf Region.54  Admiral Thad Allen retired from his post as Comman-
dant of the Coast Guard and stepped in as the first National Incident Com-
mander on May 1, 2010.55
Within the Incident Command System, the Unified Area Command—
located in New Orleans, Louisiana (after a short period in Roberts, Louisi-
ana)—was under the National Incident Command.56  The Unified Area
Command was headed by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, who oversaw
operational activities across the entire Gulf Region.57  The Unified Area
Command included the Coast Guard, BP as the responsible party, and the
five affected states.58
Under the Unified Area Command there were five Incident Command
Posts, one in each of the Gulf States, established to coordinate operations
with local and regional elected officials, the two largest and most active of
50. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 77:6–8; UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ON SCENE R
COORDINATOR REPORT: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 3 (2011) [hereinafter USCG REPORT] (“Be-
cause of the size and scope of the spill, the response organization required to combat it was
unique in many respects.”); see also ROGER LAFERRIERE, FACTORS IN BUILDING AN INCIDENT COM -
MAND ORGANIZATION FOR THE LARGEST OIL SPILL IN U.S. HISTORY 1 (2011) (“In the words of a
nationally recognized ICS expert, Mr. Charles Mills, President of Emergency Management
Systems Incorporated, ‘This was the most complex incident managed with ICS in the his-
tory of its use.’”).
51. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 570 (E.D. La. 2015).
52. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2016).
53. See USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 6–9. R
54. See id. at 3, 6–9.
55. Allen & Brennan Transcript, supra note 42. R
56. See In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 507–08 ¶ 58 (E.D. La. 2014).
57. See USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 6. R
58. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 125:25–126:03; see also In re Oil Spill, 77 F. R
Supp. 3d at 507 ¶¶ 47, 53, 58.
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which were in Houma, Louisiana and Mobile, Alabama.59  The Incident
Command Posts directed tactical efforts—addressing the particular mission
of the post.  Several of the posts were focused on fighting the spread of oil
and preventing the oil from reaching the shoreline.60  One of the Incident
Command Posts had responsibility for stopping the flow of oil from the sea
floor.61
Finally, under the Incident Command Posts, there were branches and
staging areas established to coordinate the efficient and effective distribu-
tion and use of critical resources across regional boundaries.62  For instance,
in Louisiana, nine branches were set up, some of which were large enough
to be incident command posts themselves.63
Within and as adjuncts to this Incident Command System, many fed-
eral agencies were involved in the response.64  Given the unique scientific
issues raised by trying to close a well that was a mile below the ocean’s
surface, many of the scientific agencies contributed their expertise.65  Seven
National Laboratories affiliated with the Department of Energy as well as
the U.S. Geologic Survey within the Department of the Interior joined the
response, as did numerous volunteers from the oil and gas industry and
academia.66  In all, more than ninety different organizations assisted in the
response, including regulatory, academic, and military organizations, and
other oil companies.67
The massive response also required thousands of responders.  For in-
stance, the Coast Guard deployed roughly fourteen percent of its personnel
59. See USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 3. R
60. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 105:25–106:03. R
61. Id.; see also USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at vii. R
62. See USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 3.  One of the most critical resources turned R
out to be boom, which was used to protect shoreline, encircle oil for burning, and many other
purposes.  Early in the response there simply was not enough boom to meet all the needs
and significant disputes arose among various authorities regarding the deployment of boom.
See Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 126:1–17. R
63. Id. at 77:15–21.
64. Iris Cross Deposition, 102:16–103:02, 106:16–25, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. June 26, 2014) [hereinafter Cross Deposition].
65. See Jane Lubchenco Deposition, 46:02-46:25, 47:04-47, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. July 10, 2014).
66. Cross Deposition, supra note 64, at 102:16-103:02, 106:16–25; Transcript of Trial, R
supra note 46, at 90:18–22.  Chevron, Exxon, and Shell each loaned expertise and equipment R
and Chevron leased space to BP America Inc. for the response for a single dollar. See Letter
from Roger Tucker, Jr., Manager, GOM Shorebases and Marine Transportation, Chevron, to
BP America, Inc., In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179, (E.D. La. May 26, 2010), Trial Exhibit
230370; Transcript of Trial at 1552:02–22, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan.
27, 2015); Cross Deposition, supra note 64, at 95:16–25, 98:13–20. R
67. Cross Deposition, supra note 64, at 95:16–25. R
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to respond to the spill at the peak.68 More than 19,000 people from BP
staff, contractors, government, industry, and volunteers were working on
the response in September 2010.69
The incident also required unprecedented response actions. In response
to the disaster, recreational and commercial fishing grounds were closed.70
At the peak of the closures, commercial and recreational fishing was pre-
vented in an area that amounted to 88,552 square miles—roughly fifteen
percent of Gulf waters and thirty percent of the Federal Gulf waters tradi-
tionally open to fishing.71  In addition, on July 12, 2010, Secretary of the
Interior Ken Salazar imposed a moratorium on deep water drilling.72
In response to the disaster, on May 19, 2010, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior undertook a reorganization of the Minerals Management Service,
which prior to the disaster had been responsible for overseeing oil and gas
68. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 96:09–16. R
69. USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 200; Cross Deposition, supra note 64, 92:23–25; R
Email from May T. Chau to John Fink et al. (Sept. 16, 2010, 19:33:56), In re Oil Spill, No.
10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2010), Trial Exhibit 12023.
70. See Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Emergency
Fisheries Closure in the Gulf of Mexico Due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 75 Fed.
Reg. 24,822 (May 6, 2010); Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic;
Amendment to Emergency Fisheries Closure in the Gulf of Mexico Due to the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,679 (May 12, 2010); Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of
Mexico, and South Atlantic; Emergency Fisheries Closures in the Southeast Region Due to
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill; Amendment 2, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,217 (May 14, 2010); Fish-
eries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Emergency Fisheries Closures
in the Southeast Region Due to the Deepwater Horizon MC252 Oil Spill; Publication of
Coordinates, 75 Fed. Reg. 50,934 (Aug. 18, 2010); Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mex-
ico, and South Atlantic; Emergency Fisheries Closure in the Gulf of Mexico Due to the
Deepwater Horizon MC252 Oil Spill; Amendment 3, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,648 (Dec. 1, 2010).
The closures were completely lifted by February 24, 2014. See Fisheries of the Caribbean,
Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Highly Migratory Species; Withdrawal of Emergency
Regulations Related to the Deepwater Horizon MC252 Oil Spill, 79 Fed. Reg. 10,028 (Feb.
24, 2014).
71. BP Parties’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Action Complaint for Private Ec-
onomic Losses and Property Damages at 179, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
May 7, 2012), Rec. Doc. 6453; Diane Austin, Expert Report: Sociocultural Effects of the
Deepwater Horizon Disaster in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico at 28, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-
2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2014), Trial Exhibit 13112.
72. Memorandum from the Sec’y of the Interior on Suspension of Outer Continental
Shelf Drilling of New Deepwater Wells to the MMS Dir., In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. May 28, 2010), Trial Exhibit 12155.  The moratorium was lifted on October 12,
2010. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar: Deepwater Drilling May Resume for
Operators Who Clear Higher Bar for Safety, Environmental Protection (Oct. 12, 2010),
https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Deepwater-Drilling-May-Resume-for-Op-
erators-Who-Clear-Higher-Bar-for-Safety-Environmental-Protection.
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development on the Outer Continental Shelf.73  Eventually, the responsi-
bilities of the former Minerals Management Service were divided among
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement.74
B. Stopping the Flow of Oil
As the other Incident Command Posts worked on minimizing the ef-
fects of the oil already in the environment, personnel at the Houston Inci-
dent Command Post struggled mightily to stop the flow of oil from the
Macondo well.75  In multiple daily calls, prominent scientists, the Secretar-
ies of Energy and the Interior, and engineers from across the oil industry
consulted regarding the efforts’ current status and devised new approaches
to this unprecedented problem.76
At first, the effort was focused on activating the “seven separate closing
devices on the” blowout preventer in the hope that the well could be closed
with the valves already in place.77  Using remotely operated subsea vehicles,
the Unified Command tried to activate the valves to close the well.78
When it became clear that the Unified Command could not use the
blowout preventer to stop the flow of oil, several other methods of captur-
ing the oil were attempted—each of which failed.  First, there was the coffer
dam—a large metal box that was intended to contain the flow of oil and
allow it to be piped to a vessel on the surface—which failed because hydrates
formed within the box and prevented its proper placement.79  The next
highly public attempt was a “top kill”—an attempt to stop the flow of oil by
quickly pumping heavy drilling mud at high pressure to overwhelm the
upward flow of oil and drive the oil back into the reservoir.80  Included with
73. See Sec’y of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3302 (June 18, 2010); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Swears-In Michael R. Bromwich to Lead Bureau of




74. See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., The Reorganization of the Former MMS, ABOUT
BOEM, http://www.boem.gov/Reorganization/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2016).
75. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 507–08 ¶54 (E.D. La. 2014).
76. Id. at 507–08 ¶¶ 54–66.
77. See USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 22. R
78. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 508 ¶¶ 69–70.
79. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 504 ¶ 20, 510 ¶ 104.  Shortly thereafter, the
responders installed a tube inside the pipe that had connected the well to the Deepwater
Horizon (known as the riser) which began collecting some oil, but was unable to stop the
majority of the oil from reaching the ocean. Id. at 506 ¶ 39, 511 ¶¶ 108, 110, 116.
80. See USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 23. R
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this effort was a “junk shot” that sent literal junk—pieces of rubber tires,
golf balls, and similar materials—down the well to block the flow of oil.81
By May 29, 2010, it was clear these three efforts had failed.82  A partial
solution was then implemented: installing a “Top Hat” on the blowout pre-
venter to capture a portion of the hydrocarbon flow and direct it to surface
vessels for collection of oil and flaring of gas.83
Ultimately, the Unified Command decided to install a capping stack—
essentially a small blowout preventer—on top of the failed blow out pre-
venter.84  This took some time to design and build, but by July 10, 2010 the
responders were installing the capping stack.85  Careful tests were con-
ducted to ensure that closing the well using the capping stack would not
cause so much pressure in the reservoir so as to crack the reservoir and
cause an uncontrollable subsurface blowout from many sites.86  On July 15,
2010, the capping stack was used to close all flow from the well.87  Much
more monitoring was conducted and on August 3, 2010, the Unified Com-
mand decided it was safe to leave the capping stack in place until a more
permanent closure could be achieved.88  Finally, after three million barrels
of oil had reached the ocean and its shores, oil was no longer flowing into
the sea.89
Throughout these months of efforts focused on the top of the well,
parallel work was done planning and drilling the longer-term solution
known as a relief well.90  The relief well would be drilled to intercept the
Macondo well and seal it shut permanently from the bottom.91  On Septem-
ber 19, 2010, the relief well intercepted the original well and cement was set
in place.92  At that time, Admiral Allen announced:
After months of extensive operations planning and execution under
the direction and authority of the U.S. government science and
engineering teams, BP has successfully completed the relief well by
81. Id.
82. Id. at 22–23.
83. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 512 ¶¶ 138–39.
84. Id. at 513 ¶ 151.
85. Id. at 514 ¶¶ 168–69.
86. Id. at 514 ¶¶ 172–81.
87. Id. at 514–15 ¶¶ 182–201.
88. Transcript of Trial at 1528:09–32:07, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
Oct. 8, 2013); Stephen H. Hickman et al., Scientific Basis for Safely Shutting in the Macondo
Well After the April 20, 2010 Deepwater Horizon Blowout, 109 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF
THE U.S. 20268, 20271 (2012).
89. Id. at 516 ¶ 204.
90. Id. at 508–09 ¶ 71.
91. Id. at 508–09 ¶¶ 70–72.
92. USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 23; In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 516 ¶¶ 210–12. R
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intersecting and cementing the well nearly 18,000 feet below the
surface.  With this development . . . we can finally announce that
the Macondo 252 well is effectively dead.93
C. Cleaning Up the Oil that Escaped
Given the broad reach of the oil, it is impossible in this Article to ade-
quately describe the massive cleanup operations.  It is important, however,
to get a sense of the breadth and scope of these efforts.  Among the various
efforts was the unprecedented application of dispersants.  Airplanes flew
over the plume every day that weather permitted, dropping dispersants over
the oil in order to break up the oil slicks before they reached the shoreline,
where cleanup and removal of the oil was more difficult.  The Unified
Command applied 43,884 barrels of dispersant—an amount so large that if
it were accidentally discharged it would constitute one of the largest chemi-
cal spills in American waters.94
The Unified Command also used in situ burns—gathering the oil using
floating containment boom and burning the oil on the surface of the water—
to prevent the oil from reaching shore.  Again, the size of the spill lead to
an unprecedented number of burns.  In all, the Unified Command con-
ducted 411 separate in situ burns that involved eleven million gallons of
oil.95  Put differently, in the course of the response, the Unified Command
burned more oil than the Exxon Valdez spilled.96
In addition to dispersants and in situ burns, the responders used every
available skimmer and every foot of boom to contain and collect as much of
the oil from the surface before it reached shore.  In all 835 skimming vessels
and well over a million feet of boom were used to contain and collect about
five percent of the oil released during the spill.97
93. Allen: Macondo Well is Dead, MARINE LOG (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.marinelog
.com/DOCS/NEWSMMIX/2010sep00191.html (quoting Admiral Thad Allen); REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 169.
94. The Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Calculator Deepwater Hori-
zon at 24–27, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 2010), Trial Exhibit 9182.
95. Thad Allen, National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon
at 5, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 2010), Trial Exhibit 9100.
96. Laferriere Deposition, supra note 47, at 209:22–210:04. R
97. USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 215 (providing number of skimmers and feet of R
boom); Thad Allen, National Incident Commander’s Report at 5, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2010), Trial Exhibit 9100 (“We procured boom from all domes-
tic manufacturers, and mobilized all East and Gulf Coast offshore skimming vessels.  As a
result of demand, we procured nearly all nationally produced snare, containment, and fire
boom, and engaged every domestic boom supplier to boost manufacture from a few thousand
feet per week.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA103.txt unknown Seq: 17 19-MAY-17 12:50
Fall 2016] The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Litigation 81
Despite these herculean efforts to prevent the oil from reaching the
shore, ultimately, over 1,000 miles of shoreline were oiled to one degree or
another.98  “Once oil reached the shore, the labor-intensive process of shore-
line cleanup began.”99  Shoreline cleanup involves a balancing to ensure that
the method chosen to clean up the oil does not cause more harm than
good.100  Thus, every site that was oiled needed to be identified and evalu-
ated before a cleanup method could be chosen.  Often, cleanup involved the
manual removal of oil, oiled sediment, and debris on hot beaches in hazard-
ous protection gear.101
There were many other onshore and offshore response actions, includ-
ing wildlife rehabilitation, skimming oil, installing and maintaining boom,
providing safety measures and medical treatment, and of course the admin-
istration and planning required to coordinate all of these actions.102  The
response continued for years—as late as January 2015 the Coast Guard and
BP were still maintaining command posts to respond to ongoing reports of
oiling from the Macondo well.103
IV. FEDERAL STATUTES CONTROLLING OIL SPILL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, LIABILITY, AND FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT104
Even before the response actions ended, an onslaught of investigations
and litigation began.  To understand these investigations and litigation, it is
important to review the governing statutes and requirements.  Because the
Macondo Well was fifty miles off-shore, it was subject to the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act.105  This act establishes the federal regulatory frame-
work for offshore drilling and extends the jurisdiction of the United States
to the subsoil and seabed on the outer continental shelf for the purpose of
controlling the exploitation of natural resources.106  The Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management within the Department of the Interior regulates the
operations of the ocean block lessees, such as the lease controlled by BP.107
98. Transcript of Trial, supra note 66, at 1775:22–25. R
99. USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at vii. R
100. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 83:06-83:15. R
101. USCG REPORT, supra note 50, at 65–69. R
102. See generally id. at vi–xiv.
103. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 135:18–136:11. R
104. There are of course other federal statutes that could apply, but this article focuses
on the statutes that came most into play in the MDL.
105. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2012).
106. Id. § 1332.
107. See Reorganization of Title 30: Bureaus of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
and Ocean Energy Management, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,432, 64,434 tbl. A (Oct. 18, 2011)
(“BOEM will be responsible for issuing the permits and notices and overseeing the activities
under the approved permits . . . .”).
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The Bureau has promulgated regulations that govern offshore drilling.
Some of the regulations include general prohibitions on polluting
activities.108
In addition, the Oil Pollution Act establishes a federal framework to
address oil spill liability and compensation.  This Act provides that “each
responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged . . .
into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages . . . that result
from such incident.”109  A “responsible party” in the case of a vessel is “any
person owning [or] operating . . . the vessel” and in the case of an offshore
facility, “the lessee or permittee of the area in which the [offshore] facility is
located or the holder of a right of use and easement.”110  Additionally, in the
case of a discharge from a facility on the Outer Continental Shelf, the
United States may recover all removal costs from “the owner or operator of
such facility or vessel.”111
Under the Oil Pollution Act, responsible parties are jointly and sever-
ally liable for all removal costs and damages resulting from the spill, and the
United States may commence an action for the recovery of removal costs at
any time after it incurs such costs.112  Removal costs are “costs of removal
that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or . . . the costs to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such an incident.”113
The Oil Pollution Act specifies six categories of recoverable damages.
The first category, natural resource damages, includes “[d]amages for injury
to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing the damage.”114  Other damages categories in-
clude economic loss from destruction of real or personal property; loss of
subsistence use of natural resources; net loss of taxes, royalties, and fees
recoverable by the United States or a State; and loss of profits or earning
capacity.115
108. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.107 (2015) (Operator must protect the environment by
“[p]erforming all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner; and [m]aintaining all equip-
ment and work areas in a safe condition”); 30 C.F.R. § 250.300(a) (2015) (“[L]essee shall not
create conditions that will pose unreasonable risk to public health, life, property, aquatic life,
wildlife, recreation, navigation, commercial fishing or other uses of the ocean.”).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012).
110. Id. § 2701(32)(A)–(C).
111. Id. § 2704(c)(3).
112. Id. §§ 2704(a)(3), 2717(f)(2).  Financial guarantors who provide evidence of finan-
cial responsibility for a responsible party are liable for costs and damages up to the amounts
of their guarantees. Id. § 2716(f).
113. Id. § 2701(31).
114. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
115. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B)–(E).
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The Act limits the amount of damages that responsible parties must
pay.116  The limits vary according to vessel or facility type.117  The limita-
tion that applies to the co-lessees provides that responsible parties for a spill
from an offshore facility are liable for all removal costs plus $75 million.118
No damages cap applies, however:
[I]f the incident was proximately caused by (A) gross negligence or
willful misconduct of, or (B) the violation of an applicable Federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation by, the responsible
party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible
party.119
The third key statute in play is the Clean Water Act, which provides
authority to the federal government to require a responsible party to fund
or perform cleanup actions.120  Section 311(b) of this Act prohibits:
The discharge of oil . . . into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of
the contiguous zone [or] in connection with activities under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . in such quantities as may
be harmful.121
The Clean Water Act establishes strict liability for a civil penalty against
“[a]ny person who is the owner, operator, or person in charge of any ves-
sel . . . or offshore facility from which oil or a hazardous substance is dis-
charged.”122  A “vessel” is “every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water.”123  An “offshore facility” is “any facility of any kind located in, on, or
under, any of the navigable waters of the United States, and any facility of
116. Id. § 2704.
117. Id. § 2704(a).
118. Id. § 2704(a)(3).
119. Id. § 2704(c)(1).  On October 18, 2010, BP submitted a statement to the court
waiving “the statutory limitation on liability under OPA” without agreeing that it had com-
mitted gross negligence. Statement of BP Exploration & Production Inc. re Applicability of
Limit of Liability Under Oil Pollution Act of 1990 at 1–2, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010), Rec. Doc. 559.
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (2012).
121. Id. § 1321(b)(3).  EPA has promulgated regulations that define harmful quantities
as those discharges of oil that cause “a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of
the water or adjoining shorelines or cause a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the
surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines.” 40 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2015).
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A).
123. Id. § 1321(a)(3).
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any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and is
located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a vessel.”124
Under the Clean Water Act, civil penalties have a maximum amount of
$1,100 per barrel of oil discharged.125  If the discharge of oil was “the result
of gross negligence or willful misconduct of [any person who is the owner,
operator, or person in charge of any vessel or offshore facility],” the penalty
rises to a maximum of $4,300126 per barrel of oil discharged.127
The penalty amounts—$1,100 per barrel, or, in the event of gross negli-
gence, $4,300 per barrel—are statutory maximums that courts rarely award.
The Clean Water Act specifies eight penalty factors that the court shall
consider in determining the penalty amount, including the seriousness of
the violation, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and other
factors discussed below.128
V. INITIAL SAFETY INVESTIGATION
While the removal actions were continuing, the Executive branch also
worked diligently to address looming questions.  If the Deepwater Horizon
disaster could happen, what’s to stop it from happening again?  Even after
the oil is stopped, how does one restore the damage done? Several steps
were taken.
A month after the explosion, the President issued an executive order
establishing a “National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill,” with seven members selected by the President.129  The Co-Chair
Members were Senator Bob Graham and former EPA Administrator Wil-
liam Reilly.130  The Commission had no subpoena authority but still hired
experts and conducted six public hearings.131  On January 11, 2011, the
124. Id. § 1321(a)(11).
125. Id. § 1321(b)(7)(A).
126. The amounts identified in this above are the statutory penalty amounts adjusted for
inflation. Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2461, amended by
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. § 3701; 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2015).
127. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D).
128. Id. § 1321(b)(8); see infra Section IX.G.4.
129. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010).
130. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 356.  Another member was Dr. Don
Boesch, who eventually testified in the civil trial. Id. at 357; Transcript of Trial, In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2015).
131. See Exec. Order No. 13,543, § 4, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010) (providing for
hearings but giving no authority for issuance of subpoenas).  Each of the Commission’s
hearings was announced as a “public meeting” in the Federal Register. See, e.g., National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 75 Fed. Reg.
47,584 (Aug. 6, 2010).  Details regarding each of the six public hearings can be found at the
archived site for the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
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Commission had issued its final report.132  This report presented the Com-
mission’s conclusions regarding the causes of the blowout, gave a detailed
chronology of the disaster and response, and made recommendations re-
garding future regulatory reform.133  It was a superb product produced in a
timely fashion.
Additionally, the Coast Guard is charged with investigating marine cas-
ualties,134 just as the National Transportation Safety Board investigates the
causes of airline crashes to prevent future accidents.135  These investigations
include subpoena power136 and result in a report that is not admissible in
litigation.137  Because the Deepwater Horizon engaged in maritime functions
and drilling activities, the Coast Guard’s safety investigation for this disas-
ter was performed jointly with the Department of the Interior.138  This
Joint Investigation Team conducted seven public hearings and heard testi-
mony from more than eighty witnesses.139  In September 2011, the Depart-
ment of the Interior issued its portion of the report.140  In response to the
Offshore Drilling. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling, Meeting 1: July 12-13, 2010 (New Orleans, LA), MEETINGS, https://cybercemetery.unt
.edu/archive/oilspill/20121210183605/http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/meeting-1/meet-
ing-details (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
132. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 365.
133. See generally id.  Despite a finding that the Commission’s report was a public record
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), the court overseeing the ensuing multi-district liti-
gation excluded the report from evidence because of the risk that the large amount of “inter-
nal hearsay” would cause mini-trials and delay in the resolution of the first phase of the trial.
See In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179, 2012 WL 425164, at *1–*2 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2012).
134. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6308 (2010).
135. See generally National Transportation Safety Board, History of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board, ABOUT, http://www.ntsb.gov/about/history/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Dec. 26, 2016).
136. 46 U.S.C. § 6304 (2010).
137. Id. § 6308; see also Newill v. Campbell Transp. Co., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-1344, 2015
WL 222438, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015) (“When § 6308 is ‘read together’ with the
implementing regulations, the court reasoned, it ‘is clear that the scope of the statutory
protection is limited to the Coast Guard’s investigative report, and anything included within
that report, in order to avoid having the Coast Guard’s investigative report and its conclu-
sions influence the litigation process.’ ” (quoting Guest v. Carnival Corp., 917 F. Supp. 2d
1242, 1244–45 (S.D. Fla. 2012))).
138. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior & U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Joint Department of
the Interior and Department of Homeland Security Statement of Principles and Convening
Order Regarding Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and
Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf
of Mexico 21-22 April 2010 (2010), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/deepwater_horizon_
investigaton.pdf.
139. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP ’T OF THE
INTERIOR, REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSES OF THE APRIL 20, 2010 MACONDO WELL BLOWOUT 11
(2011), http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/DWH_IR/reports/dwhfinal.pdf.
140. See generally id.
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findings in the report, the Department made significant reforms to its regu-
lations governing well design and workplace safety.141
There were several other safety investigations.  One was conducted by
the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, an independent agency established under
the Clean Air Act to investigate the root cause of chemical accidents.142
Additionally, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the National
Academies of Sciences and the National Research Council prepared a report
on the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon for future offshore
drilling.143
VI. THE GULF COAST ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION PLAN
AND THE RESTORE ACT
On June 15, 2010, the President called on Ray Mabus, then Secretary of
the Navy and formerly the Governor of the State of Mississippi, to “develop
a long-term Gulf Coast Restoration Plan as soon as possible.”144  The result-
ing report recommended the “immediate establishment of a new Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Task Force.”145
By October 5, 2010, the President acted on that recommendation and
established the Task Force to develop “a Gulf Coast ecosystem restoration
agenda, including goals for ecosystem restoration.”146  The task force, led by
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Lisa Jackson,
was comprised of senior officials from the Departments of Defense, Justice,
the Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce, and the Environmental Protection
Agency, as well as several offices in the Executive Office of the Presi-
141. See, e.g., Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf –
Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 77 Fed.
Reg. 50,856, 50,856 (Aug. 22, 2012) (“This Final Rule implements certain safety measures
recommended in the report entitled, ‘Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development
on the Outer Continental Shelf.’ ”).  In the end, the Coast Guard did not issue a final report
of its investigation.
142. See generally Chemical Safety Board, History, ABOUT THE CSB, http://www.csb.gov/
about-the-csb/history/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
143. NAT’L ACAD. OF ENGINEERING & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MACONDO
WELL–Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety ix (2012),
https://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/mocando-
well_lessons_2011.pdf.
144. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on
the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-pres-
ident-nation-bp-oil-spill.
145. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, AMERICA’S GULF COAST: A LONG TERM RECOVERY
PLAN AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 1 (2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/pdf/gulf-recovery-sep-2010.pdf.
146. Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313 (Oct. 8, 2010).
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dent.147  By December 2011, the Task Force issued its “Gulf of Mexico Re-
gional Ecosystem Restoration Strategy,”148 which set forth four ecosystem
restoration goals: restore and conserve habitat, restore water quality, replen-
ish and protect living marine and coastal resources, and enhance community
resilience.149  In achieving these goals, the report called for science-based
adaptive management.150  This report later provided valuable information
for the natural resource assessment and restoration planning.
The second major recommendation of Secretary Mabus’ report was a
proposal to Congress to dedicate Clean Water Act civil penalties collected
for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to the Gulf Coast.151  Under the Act’s oil
spill civil penalty provisions, the penalties are deposited in the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund,152 which is a fund available to support government
responses to oil spills like the Deepwater Horizon disaster.153  As will be
discussed below, Congress acted on this recommendation.
The Executive branch was not alone in focusing its attention on the
causes and cures for the disaster.  Following the initial oil spill, there were
numerous congressional hearings highlighted by highly-publicized testi-
mony from the key companies involved.  The 111th Congress held more
than sixty hearings on a variety of oil-spill related topics, and members
introduced more than 150 legislative proposals.  In addition to two bills that
provided funding for the response, investigations, and litigation, Congress
ultimately passed one substantive bill directly related to the Deepwater Hori-
zon disaster.154
That substantive act was the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability,
Tourist Opportunities and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States
147. Id. § 2(a).
148. See GULF COAST ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION TASK FORCE, GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION STRATEGY 1 (2011), https://archive.epa.gov/gulfcoasttaskforce/web/
pdf/gulfcoastreport_full_12-04_508-1.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Notably, the damage assessment and restoration plan for the Deepwater Horizon
incident, discussed infra n.187–06, 473–80 and associated text, also incorporated these four
goals. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Final
Programmatic Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan and Final Programmatic Environ-
mental Impact Statement, § 1.5.3 (2016) [hereinafter NOAA ASSESSMENT], http://www.gulf-
spillrestoration.noaa.gov/restoration-planning/gulf-plan.
151. MABUS, supra note 145, at 145. R
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(s) (2012).
153. 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (2012).
154. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Deepwater Horizon OIL SPILL: RECENT
ACTIVITIES AND ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS 12–14 (2015), https://archive.org/details/R42942Deep
waterHorizonOilSpillRecentActivitiesandOngoingDevelopments-crs.
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Act, or “RESTORE Act.”155  As Secretary Mabus recommended, the RE-
STORE Act provides that the civil penalties collected for the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill are to be returned to the injured area.  Specifically, the Act
requires that 80% of all civil and administrative penalties be placed in the
Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund, established for environmental restora-
tion, economic recovery projects, and tourism and seafood promotion in the
five Gulf States directly affected by the spill.156
The RESTORE Act also created a new independent federal entity—the
Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council—to administer aspects of the
program,157 and the President transferred to the Council the responsibilities
that had previously rested with the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task
Force.158  The funds are administrated by a commission selected by the
states and chaired by a Presidential appointee.159  On March 1, 2016, the
President rotated the Chair position from the Secretary of Commerce to
the Secretary of Agriculture.160
Putting those elements together, the RESTORE process works as fol-
lows.161  First, of the 80% of the total civil penalties that are deposited in
the Trust Fund, 35% is distributed to the Gulf States per capita.162  Second,
30% is to be spent by the Council, for ecosystem restoration, under a Com-
prehensive Plan.163  Third, 30% is distributed to the Gulf States pro rata
based on oil impacts, to be spent under State Expenditure Plans, which
require approval of the Council.164  Finally, 5%165 goes to Centers of Excel-
lence research grants,166 and the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science,
155. Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 1601–1608, 126 Stat. 405, 588–607 (Jul. 6, 2012) (partially
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t) & note).
156. Id. § 1602(b).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(2) (2012).
158. Exec. Order No. 13,626, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,749 (Sept. 13, 2012).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(2)(C)(iv)–(v).
160. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Obama Administration Announces New Chair
of Restore Council and Reaffirms Commitment to Gulf Region (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www
.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2016/03/0055.xml&printable=true&con
tentidonly=true.
161. For a graphic depicting this allocation see Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration
Council, About the RESTORE Act, HISTORY, https://restorethegulf.gov/history/about-restore-
act (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(A).
163. Id. § 1321(t)(2)(A) (30% to carry out the Comprehensive Plan), (t)(2)(B) (ecosys-
tem restoration).
164. Id. § 1321(t)(3)(A) (30% pro rata), (t)(3)(B) (council to approve state expenditure
plans).
165. Restore Act, §§ 1604(h), 1605(a).
166. Id. § 1605.
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Observation, Monitoring and Technology Program within the Department
of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.167
VII. ASSESSING THE HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND
PLANNING FOR RESTORATION
A. Overview of the Effects of the Disaster
There are several categories of effects that must be noted when placing
the ultimate resolution of the litigation in context.  First, “responding to an
oil spill is an inherently dangerous” activity.168  Response workers were sub-
jected to incredibly stressful and dangerous conditions.  Because direct ex-
posure to oil can cause skin reactions, respiratory symptoms, and
neurological effects, workers cleaning up the oiled beaches were required to
work in protective clothing.169  The cleanup, which was occurring during
the hottest months of the year, resulted in numerous heat-related illnesses.
For example, BP’s data shows over 2,000 visits to the response area health
clinics for heat-related conditions.170  Other workers exhibited symptoms of
illness arising from direct exposure to the oil.171  Further, the physically
dangerous conditions—working on boats on the ocean, for instance—re-
sulted in broken limbs and other injuries including severed fingers and bro-
ken bones.172  BP’s own data shows there were at least 5,986 visits to the
health clinics during the response.  Eighteen response workers were hospi-
talized as a result of injury or illness related to the response.173
In addition to the immediate effects of the explosion and fire and the
injuries and risks imposed on response workers, the release of more than
three million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico over eighty-seven days
167. Id. § 1605(c)–(d).
168. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 82:10-82:11. R
169. Richard W. Clapp, Expert Report: Human Health Impact of Deepwater Horizon
Explosion, Oil Spill, and Response at 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Aug.
15, 2014), Trial Exhibit 13346.
170. See Richard W. Clapp, Expert Report: Human Health Impact of Deepwater Hori-
zon Explosion, Oil Spill, and Response at 19, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
Sept. 12, 2014), Trial Exhibit 13347.
171. See Clapp, supra note 169, at 6–10. R
172. BP Recordable Injury and Illness Data at 4, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Dec. 3, 2010), Trial Exhibit 12020 (summarizing 5,986 injury and illness incidents
by body part and geographic location); id. at 7, 25, 53, 64 (documenting severed or ampu-
tated fingers); id. at 4, 7, 9, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 46, 53, 56, 58, 61,
70 (documenting fractured or broken bones).
173. Clapp, supra note 170, at 3. R
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obviously had environmental effects.174  The spill extended over more than
43,000 square miles, damaged and temporarily closed fisheries vital to the
gulf economy, oiled hundreds of miles of beaches, coastal wetlands and mar-
shes, and killed thousands of birds and other marine wildlife among other
economic and natural resources injuries.175  Oil was washed up onto more
than 400 square miles of the sea floor and washed up onto more than 1,300
miles of shoreline from Texas to Florida.176  Five states were directly af-
fected by the oil spill: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Flor-
ida.177  From the very onset of this spill, the Coast Guard recognized that
“[t]his event had the potential to affect every species in the gulf.  We were
fighting to save an ecosystem and a way of life that were at stake.”178
The economic and social consequences of the spill were also wide-
spread.  The spill occurred just as the affected region was beginning to re-
cover from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike.179  As a result of the
fisheries closure, the spill itself, and the drilling moratorium discussed be-
low, the spill disrupted livelihoods and patterns of daily living, exacerbated
social and economic inequality in the region, challenged individual identity,
fostered conflict and divisiveness, and disempowered local governments and
charitable organizations.180
As Judge Carl J. Barbier, assigned to oversee the civil actions related to
the spill, stated: “The seriousness of this violation cannot be overstated.
The oil spill was extremely serious. It was gravely serious. It was a massive
and severe tragedy.”181
B. The Natural Resources Damages Assessment and
Restoration Program
As other investigations and response actions were occurring, and as a
complex civil action was brewing, outside of the judicial system a massive,
multi-agency, multi-government regulatory administrative process was un-
174. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 525 ¶ 277 (E.D. La. 2014); REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 165 (describing July 15, 2010 as the “first time in 87 days no oil
flowed into the Gulf of Mexico”).
175. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 569–70 (E.D. La. 2015).
176. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. and Five Gulf States Reach Historic




178. Summary of Interview of Adm. Mary Landry at 7, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-
2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2010), Trial Exhibit 7802.
179. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 173:09–173:11. R
180. Id. at 160:17–161:23.  For a full discussion of these harms, see Austin, supra note 71. R
181. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 570 (E.D. La. 2015).
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derway to prepare a natural resource damages assessment.182  This under-
taking was a significant effort of scientific inquiry, intended to identify
what happened to the ecology of the affected area and to determine the best
way to restore the lost natural resources.
1. A Very Short Primer on the Law Authorizing
this Investigation
Under the Oil Pollution Act, the natural resource damage assessment
process has the goal of restoring natural resources to the condition they
would have been in had the oil spill not occurred.183  This process involves
assessing the type and extent of harm to natural resources, and the amount
of money necessary to fund projects to replace or restore natural resources –
and the services they provide.184  The assessment process is a legal, scien-
tific, engineering, and economic process with public input.185
The natural resource damages assessment is implemented by federal,
state, and tribal natural resource “trustees,”186 who are trustees in the usual
sense of the word: the natural resources are the trust corpus, which is ad-
ministered by the trustees for the beneficiaries: the people.  Like any trust-
ees, their job includes seeking compensation to the trust for any losses
caused by third parties.  “Trustee” agencies conduct the damages assess-
ment, seek to recover damages from the responsible party, and then use the
damages to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of the damaged natu-
ral resources.187
In general terms, the Oil Pollution Act provides that it is the duty of
the trustees to develop a damage assessment and restoration plan
(DARP).188  Regulations specify various considerations for this document,
but at its most simplistic, the document sets out: (1) the trustees’ findings as
to injury to, destruction of, loss of, and loss of use of natural resources
resulting from the oiling incident; and (2) selection of the proposed restora-
tion actions from among the various reasonable alternatives that could com-
182. The specific phrase “natural resource damages” does not appear in OPA (nor in the
other analogous states that create similar claims); still, natural resource damages is a term,
and NRD and NRDA are acronyms used by those who practice in the field.
183. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2016).
184. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d) (2016).
185. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has promulgated
regulations establishing the process for assessing natural resource damages through complex
scientific study. See generally 15 C.F.R. pt. 990.  The process is documented in an Adminis-
trative Record and requires public participation. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.45, 990.14(d).
186. Trustees are selected by the President and the Governors of the relevant States. 33
U.S.C. § 2706(b).
187. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(c), (d), (f); 15 C.F.R. § 990.10.
188. Id. § 2706(c)(1)(C); 15 C.F.R. § 990.55(a).
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pensate for such losses, or, if needed, monetary amounts for
compensation.189
As far as legal claims, the Oil Pollution Act provides that the claim for
natural resource damages shall be presented to the responsible party for
settlement purposes,190 but if no settlement is reached, a trustee may file a
civil action to recover the damages as set forth in the damage assessment
and restoration plan, as well as the “reasonable costs” of the assessment.191
2. Cooperation Among State and Federal Trustees in the
Deepwater Horizon Incident
The Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrates the political, scientific,
and practical challenges of implementing the provisions of the Oil Pollution
Act.  For the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, beginning in 2010, five Gulf Coast
States and four federal agencies—the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of the Interior, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Department of Agriculture—formed a Trustee Council to
carry out the administrative procedures associated with the damages
assessment.192
The Oil Pollution Act’s natural resource damages provisions provide
that both state and federal trustees share a joint trusteeship.193  The imple-
189. 15 C.F.R. § 990.55(b)(1).
190. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a) (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 990.62(a).  Note that, while Judge Barbier
ruled that “presentment” is a mandatory condition precedent to filing an OPA claim for
damages, see In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 964 (E.D. La. 2011), the statute and
regulations are not entirely clear – and there are no cases to illuminate the issue – that
preparation of a DARP is too.
191. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (2012).  In this case, the presentment steps never hap-
pened because the case preliminarily settled in globo prior to completion of the damage as-
sessment and restoration plan.
192. The Memorandum of Understanding was first signed in 2011 and amended in 2012.
See Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
and Restoration Resulting from the Deepwater Horizon Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit and
the Subsea Macondo Well (Apr. 26, 2011); Amendment One to Memorandum of Under-
standing Relating to the NRDA and Restoration Resulting from the Deepwater Horizon Mo-
bile Offshore Drilling Unit and the Subsea Macondo Well (Sept. 12, 2012).  These
agreements were superseded in 2016 by the post-settlement MOU. See Deepwater Horizon
Trust Council, Trustee Council Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Natural
Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration Resulting from the Deepwater Horizon Mobile
Offshore Drilling Unit and the Subsea Macondo Well (Mar. 22, 2016).  For additional infor-
mation regarding the natural resource damage assessment and restoration projects see the
official website for the restoration, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov.  The Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Agriculture were made trustees for
this natural resource damage assessment by Exec. Order No. 13,626, § 5, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,749, 56,751 (Sept. 10, 2012).
193. 33 U.S.C. § 2706.
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menting regulations provide that trustees “should” act jointly to ensure full
restoration without double recovery.194  There is little case law discussing
the impact of one trustee proceeding alone.195  There are, however, many
reasons that the state and federal agencies can chose to cooperate: effi-
ciency, cost sharing, pooling of expertise, and fairness to the defendants.  In
an incident of this magnitude, however, it is clear that different states ex-
perienced different impacts from the oiling event; the states also have di-
verse ecosystems, and varying types of recreational uses of the natural
resources.  It is a testament to the principles of cooperative federalism that
the federal government and the states worked together to successfully inves-
tigate the injuries to natural resources, and the alternatives to restore them.
From the very beginning of the spill, the Trustees mobilized teams of
scientists to evaluate injuries, taking into account modeled and observed oil
trajectories along the ocean surface, often while participating in the re-
sponse.196  The Trustees used field studies, laboratory studies, scientific
literature, and model-based approaches to assess injuries.197  These studies
would assist in restoration planning and in preparing for ultimate litigation.
On October 1, 2010, only sixteen days after the relief well was completed,
the Trustees collectively issued their “Notice of Intent to Conduct Restora-
tion Planning,”198 under the regulations governing natural resource damage
assessments.199  From there, injury assessment and restoration planning
continued, with the ultimate goal of publishing a damage assessment and
restoration plan.
C. BP’s Role in the Deepwater Horizon Clean-up
Effort and Funding
The Oil Pollution Act also requires the responsible party to pay the
reasonable costs of the assessment of the damages and ultimately to pay the
damages awarded by a court.200  Yet at the same time, the implementing
regulations provide guidance for cooperative natural resource damages as-
sessment with the responsible party,201 and responsible parties sometimes
194. 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(a).
195. See United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067–69 (D. Idaho
2005).
196. See NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 4.1.4.1. R
197. Id. § 4.1.5.1.
198. Discharge of Oil from Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico; Intent
to Conduct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,800 (Oct. 1, 2010).
199. 15 C.F.R. § 990.41.
200. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (2012).
201. 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c).
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find it to be in their interest to cooperate with the Trustees.202  BP appar-
ently saw it that way, and from the beginning of the spill response, provided
funding for the assessment and for early projects.
BP funded three “emergency” restoration projects, as permitted under
the implementing regulations.203  This initial funding allowed the Trustees
to implement emergency restoration to: (1) prevent additional injury to and
restore submerged aquatic vegetation beds in Florida that had been de-
stroyed by propeller scarring and other response vessel impacts; (2) provide
alternative wetland habitat in Mississippi for waterfowl and shorebirds that
might otherwise winter in oil-affected habitats; and (3) improve the nesting
and hatching success of endangered sea turtles on the Texas coast.204  BP
and the Trustees entered into an “Emergency Restoration Implementation
Agreement” for BP to fund those project.205  The Deepwater Horizon spill
became one of the few uses of the emergency restoration authorities to
date.206
BP participated in the natural resource damages assessment in other
ways as well.  BP paid for early assessment work by the trustees, contrib-
uted to early restoration projects discussed below, and funded data collec-
tion and chemical analysis.207  When BP did not fund particular
investigations, the Trustees were authorized by the Oil Pollution Act to
apply for funding from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, and as necessary,
the Trustees did just that.208
VIII. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ROLE
Before turning to the civil litigation and the lessons learned, one more
player must be identified.  The Department of Justice was involved from
the first day of the disaster.  The Attorney General visited the Gulf on
202. See John C. Cruden & Matthew R. Oakes, The Past, Present, and Future of Natural
Resource Damages Claims, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 291 (2016); see also Brian D. Israel,
Natural Resource Damage Claims: Strategies for Responding to Increased Federal and State Enforce-
ment, ABA TRENDS, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 4.
203. Emergency restoration is authorized under the Oil Pollution Act regulations. See 15
C.F.R. § 990.26.
204. NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 1.4.3.1. R
205. See U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, EMERGENCY RESTORATION IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT
FOR THE MC-252 OIL SPILL (2011), https://www.fws.gov/doiddata/dwh-ar-documents/987/
DWH-AR0211929.pdf.
206. See Nicholas J. Lund & Niki L. Pace, Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage
Assessment: Where Does the Money Go?, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 327, 341 (2011).
207. NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 4.1.4.4.  To see the work plans for the data R
collection, visit the official website. NRDA Workplans, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa
.gov/oil-spill/gulf-spill-data/.
208. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)(2) (2012).
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numerous occasions while the spill continued, the United States Attorneys
of the affected States designated counsel and assisted in cleanup activities,
and senior litigation counsel were established and provided resources for
both the civil and criminal investigations.  Counsel were also assigned to
work with and assist the natural resources trustees, as well as provide legal
advice and assistance to Administration actions.
While the oil was still being released, senior officials of the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division and the Civil Division, using Coast
Guard aircrafts, visited the oil site and then met with Coast Guard officials
who were leading the recovery effort.  Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Cruden209 brought in attorneys who had experience in the Exxon Valdez
spill, gaining valuable context from their knowledge of the importance of
early identification of evidentiary needs, evidence collection protocols, col-
lecting oil samples, working with client agencies on sampling needs, and
assuring that natural resource damage needs were considered at the very
beginning of the action.  By May 2010, the Department had assembled a
litigation team led by Steve O’Rourke of the Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division and Michael Underhill of the Civil Division—reflecting
the cooperation of the Divisions within the Department.  Members of this
team were involved in the natural resource damages assessment, preparation
for litigation, evidence preservation, and other pre-filing efforts long before
the civil complaint was even filed.
The Department of Justice also participated in many of the negotiations
that resulted in the establishment of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.  This
Facility, headed by Kenneth Feinberg (who had previously been in charge of
distributing funds to the victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks), was an
independent claims facility.210  After negotiations with the Obama Admin-
istration, including the Department of Justice, BP agreed to set aside
twenty billion dollars to pay for private claims.211  Between August 23, 2010
209. On December 16, 2014, John C. Cruden was confirmed by the Senate as the Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division. See U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, https://www.justice.gov/enrd (last vis-
ited Dec. 26, 2016).
210. See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY 1 (2010), http://www
.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/library/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf (describing
the facility as an “independent claims facility” to be administered by Kenneth Feinberg);
Scott Wilson & Joel Achenbach, BP Agrees to $20 Billion Fund for Gulf Oil Spill Claims, WASH.
POST (June 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/16/
AR2010061602614.html (“The new fund will be administered by Kenneth Feinberg, the
Washington lawyer who oversaw a similar fund for victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror
attacks and who more recently was the Obama administration’s special master for executive
compensation at firms receiving federal bailout money.”).
211. Wilson & Achenbach, supra note 210.
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and the entry of the private party settlements discussed below,212 the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility accepted claims from businesses and individuals who
were damaged by the Deepwater Horizon disaster.213
IX. THE CIVIL LITIGATION
The civil litigation arising out of the Deepwater Horizon disaster is an
example of true judicial economy in litigating this potentially unwieldy law-
suit.  An examination of the pre-trial, trial, and settlement procedures
demonstrate that active judicial involvement and cooperation on appropriate
issues among even opposing counsel can achieve the goals of “just, speedy,
and inexpensive” resolution of even the most significant and hotly disputed
issues.214
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Manual
for Complex Litigation
Complex civil litigation in U.S. District Courts is typically managed
under two guiding authorities: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Manual for Complex Litigation.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were amended after this litigation was concluded, but those amendments
were presaged by many of Judge Barbier’s case management techniques.
Accordingly, a short description of the 2015 amendments to the Rules is
warranted.
In May 2010, just as the litigation from the disaster was beginning, the
Civil Rules Committee held a civil litigation conference at Duke University
School of Law.215  At the conference, almost one hundred lawyers from
various parts of the litigation world convened and discussed ways in which
to improve civil litigation procedure, particularly in light of the steadily and
dramatically increasing costs associated with discovery.216
For several years, the Rules Committee held meetings and received
comments on various proposals to reduce discovery burdens and speed up
the resolution of civil cases.  The amendments that finally took effect on
December 1, 2015, reflected numerous themes.217  First, as signaled by the
212. The Deepwater Horizon Court Supervised Settlement Program (CSSP), began op-
eration on June 4, 2012. Order at 1–2, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. July 2,
2013), Rec. Doc. 10564.
213. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 210, at 19.
214. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
215. Duke Law News, Federal Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Opens “Duke




\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA103.txt unknown Seq: 33 19-MAY-17 12:50
Fall 2016] The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Litigation 97
amendment to Rule 1, the Committee made it clear that counsel have an
obligation to use the Rules to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action and proceeding.”218  Second, the Committee
directed the courts to balance the burden of discovery requests and obliga-
tions against the size and needs of a particular case.  The most direct ex-
pression of this obligation is found in the revisions to the definition of the
scope of discovery to include that, which is both relevant to the claims and
defenses and proportional to the needs of the case.219  Third, the Commit-
tee integrated electronic discovery issues more firmly in the rules, setting
forth specific topics for discussion among parties at the Rule 16 conference,
permitting discovery requests to be served before the initial conference of
the parties to encourage more productive discovery planning, setting spe-
cific standards for objections and responses to requests for production, and
otherwise encouraging more detailed and productive cooperation among the
parties.220  Fourth, the Committee set forth a uniform standard for deter-
mining whether and which sanctions a court should apply in remedying a
party’s failure to preserve evidence.221  Justice Roberts summarized the in-
tended effect of the rules in his annual report:
Many rules amendments are modest and technical, even persnick-
ety, but the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are different.  Those amendments are the product of five years
of intense study, debate, and drafting to address the most serious
impediments to just, speedy, and efficient resolution of civil
disputes.
* * *
The amendments may not look like a big deal at first glance,
but they are.  That is one reason I have chosen to highlight them in
this report.  For example, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure has been expanded by a mere eight words, but those are
words that judges and practitioners must take to heart.  Rule 1 di-
rects that the Federal Rules “should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”  The
underscored words make express the obligation of judges and law-
yers to work cooperatively in controlling the expense and time de-
mands of litigation—an obligation given effect in the amendments
that follow.  The new passage highlights the point that lawyers—
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
219. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
220. See, e.g., id. at 26(f), 34.
221. See id. at 37(e).
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though representing adverse parties—have an affirmative duty to
work together, and with the court, to achieve prompt and efficient
resolutions of disputes.222
Though it predated these amendments, the Deepwater Horizon litigation
demonstrates that the changes contemplated by the Rules amendments will
result in more efficient resolution of even the most complex cases.
B. Formation of the Multi-District Litigation
Lawsuits arising out of the disaster began on April 21, 2010, the day
after the explosion, while the rig was still burning.223  Many of the plaintiffs
raised admiralty law claims.  They filed claims under the general maritime
law – the admiralty equivalent to common law – which provides claims for
compensatory damages for strict product liability for defective products,224
punitive damages in the case of gross negligence,225 and simple
negligence.226
Shortly after, Transocean instituted a civil action in admiralty under the
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, seeking to limit its liability for common
law or maritime claims.227  The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 provides
that a vessel owner is liable only up to the value of the vessel and its cargo
and is thus akin to limited liability for shareholders in a corporation.228
The limitation evaporates if the vessel owner cannot prove a lack of “privity
or knowledge” of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel.229
By May 2010, so many lawsuits and class actions were pending in dif-
ferent courts that certain plaintiffs, and BP itself, moved for consolidation
in the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.230  The United States filed
222. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4–6
(2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
223. See, e.g., Complaint, Roshto v. Transocean, Ltd., No. 2:10-CV-1156 (E.D. La. Apr.
21, 2010).
224. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
225. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
226. In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 943, 958 (E.D. La. 2011).  Claims for purely
economic losses unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest are generally
precluded (with an exception for commercial fishermen). Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
227. See Complaint and Petition for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, In re
Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, No. 10-2771 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2010).
228. 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2012).
229. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 753 (E.D. La. 2014).
230. See Motion of Plaintiffs for Transfer of Actions to the Eastern District of Louisiana
Pursuant to US 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, In
re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (J.P.M.L. May 6, 2010), Rec. Doc. 1; BP Exploration and
Production’s Motion to Transfer for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings
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in support of consolidation and recommended the Eastern District of Loui-
siana.231  On August 10, 2010, the Panel agreed, transferring seventy-seven
actions that had been filed in (or removed to) seven different United States
District Courts, to the Honorable Carl J. Barbier, Eastern District of Loui-
siana.  The Panel noted that the Judge “had a distinguished career as an
attorney and now as a jurist,” and that it had “every confidence that he is
well prepared to handle a litigation of this magnitude.”232
C. Setting the Judicial Structure
The day he was appointed, Judge Barbier issued Pretrial Order 1, con-
solidating the transferred cases and all “tag along” actions for pretrial pur-
poses and beginning a multi-district litigation that would ultimately involve
over one hundred thousand private party claimants.233  The Judicial Panel
on Multi-District Litigation spoke prophetically regarding the management
task ahead of Judge Barbier:
Judge Barbier has at his disposal all the many assets of the Eastern
District of Louisiana, which include magistrate judges and a clerk’s
office accustomed to handling large MDLs.  Judge Barbier may
also choose to employ special masters and other case administration
tools to facilitate certain aspects of the litigation. See Manual for
Complex Litigation, Fourth §§ 11.52, 11.53 (2004).234
Judge Barbier did just as the Panel suggested.  By June 4, 2010, Judge
Barbier had selected U.S. Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan to act as Magis-
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (J.P.M.L. May 20, 2010), Rec.
Doc. 13.
231. See United States of America’s Statement of Interest and Response to Motion to
Transfer, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (J.P.M.L. Jun. 16, 2010), Rec Doc. 98.  The state
governments, however, were initially reluctant to join the multi-district litigation, preferring
to litigate their claims in their own courts. See, e.g., Motion to Remand to State Court by
Plaintiff Louisiana State, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010), Rec.
Doc. 65.  In the end, as described below, the States’ participation in the same litigation as the
United States allowed a level of cooperation that greatly enhanced the recovery for the Gulf
of Mexico.
232. In re Oil Spill, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2010).  A second MDL was
set up in Houston for shareholder lawsuits under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp. In re BP p.l.c. Securities Litigation, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (J.P.M.L.
2010).  Separately, the Securities and Exchange Commission itself sued BP for misrepre-
senting the rate of flow of oil from the well during the spill. See Complaint, SEC v. BP,
p.l.c., No. 12-CV-2774 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2012), Rec. Doc. 1.  That case was settled for $525
million. Final Judgment as to Defendant BP p.l.c., No. 12-CV-2774 (E.D. La. Dec. 10,
2012), Rec. Doc. 5.
233. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (E.D. La. 2014).
234. In re Oil Spill, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356 (E.D. La. 2010).
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trate on the case.235  As discussed below, Judge Shushan oversaw the discov-
ery in the litigation and performed many other management tasks,
including efforts to settle the case.236  On September 24, 2010, the Court
appointed Professor Francis E. McGovern as Special Master.237  Later,
Judge Barbier appointed additional special masters as the cases progressed
and additional issues arose, chiefly related to reaching or implementing set-
tlements (as cited below).
Not surprisingly, this multi-district litigation involved numerous attor-
neys representing various parties.  For the private plaintiffs alone, there
were more than ninety attorneys.238  Judge Barbier followed the Manual for
Complex Litigation in establishing coordinating counsel for three groups of
parties: the private parties, the Defendants, and the federal government
parties, and the private plaintiffs.239  As the Manual contemplates, these
coordinating counsel were central to the efficiency of the litigation.240
They served as the counsel who coordinated discovery, made arrangements
for payment of costs of depositions and trial exhibits, and provided a dis-
crete group with which the Court could communicate on a regular basis.241
The court used a new case management tool for multi-party complex
civil actions: the “pleading bundles.”242  By Pretrial Order 11, the judge re-
quired all private plaintiffs to redo their complaints and file into one of the
following bundle sets: (A) personal injury and death claims resulting di-
rectly from the events of April 20, 2010; (B) private individual and business
economic loss claims; (C) claims by governmental entities; and (D) injunc-
235. Transcript of Status Conference at 18:01–06, Wetzel v. Transocean, Ltd., No. 10-
cv-1222 (E.D. La. June 4, 2010), Rec. Doc. 108.
236. Id.
237. Order at 3, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2010), Rec. Doc.
492 (to coordinate communications across the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, Gulf Coast
Claims Facility, and state and federal courts).
238. See Order and Reasons – Aggregate Common Benefit Fee and Cost Award at 1 n.1,
In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016), Rec. Doc. 21849 (stating that 93
attorneys were part of the application for award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs).
239. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004); Pretrial Order No. 6,
In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MD-2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2010), Rec. Doc. 110 (establishing
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee); Pretrial Order No. 10, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010), Rec. Doc. 567 (establishing the Defendants’ Steering Committee);
Pretrial Order No. 26, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2011), Rec. Doc.
1074 (establishing Coordinating Counsel for the government parties).
240. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004).
241. See Pretrial Order No. 8 at 3–4, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct.
8, 2010), Rec. Doc. 506 (setting forth responsibilities of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee).
242. Pretrial Order No. 11 at 2–5, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19,
2010), Rec. Doc. 569.
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tive and regulatory claims.243  The concept here was to allow for large clas-
ses of plaintiffs to join a “master” complaint with a short form.244
Judge Barbier’s use of pleadings bundles was new, but it was consistent
with the Manual for Complex Litigation, which encourages prompt action
to finalize the pleadings to allow for early resolution of legal issues.245  By
bundling the pleadings, the court made the efficient resolution of Rule 12
motions possible.246  For example, in ruling on Rule 12 motions to dismiss
pertaining to the B1 Master Complaint, the court concluded that the case
was in the admiralty jurisdiction, all State laws were preempted, and puni-
tive damages under the general maritime law were not displaced by the Oil
Pollution Act.247  All of these decisions simplified and narrowed the issues
for trial by making it possible to consolidate the vast majority of liability
issues in a single, phased trial.248
D. The United States Enters the Litigation
In 2010, the United States filed a complaint in the Eastern District of
Louisiana and joined the multi-district litigation, with two claims for relief:
(1) civil penalties under the Clean Water Act and (2) a declaratory judg-
243. Id.
244. See Transcript of Status Conference at 14:45–14:49, 15:47–15:48, In re Oil Spill,
No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Sep. 16, 2010), Rec. Doc. 550.  The State of Louisiana objected
to Pretrial Orders 8 and 11 as usurping its sovereignty and sought a writ of mandamus
allowing the state to operate outside of the plaintiffs’ steering committee without being part
of the “common benefit” pool from which the plaintiffs’ attorneys would be paid. Petition for
Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition at 5–8, 12–14, In re State of Louisiana, No. 11-30178 (5th
Cir. Feb. 22, 2011), Rec. No. 00511391480.  The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, finding
that the pretrial orders fell squarely within the court’s “inherent authority and discretion to
consolidate and manage complex litigation, particularly when serving as the transferee court
in a multidistrict proceeding.” Order at 2, In re State of Louisiana, No. 11-30178 (5th Cir.
Apr. 11, 2011), Rec. Doc. No. 00511442196.
245. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.31 (2004).
246. By the time of this publication, the court has been able to dismiss entire bundles on
the merits or for lack of expedience. See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 60, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2016), Rec. Doc. 16050.
247. See In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 2011).
248. It is also worth noting that Judge Barbier made use of technology to simplify ser-
vice of documents in the litigation, including amended pleadings and discovery. See Pretrial
Order No. 12 at 1 ¶ 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2010), Rec. Doc.
600 (“In order to facilitate case management, document retrieval, case organization and expe-
ditious, efficient and economical communication by and amongst counsel, the parties will
utilize the services of LexisNexis File & Serve . . . and its litigation system for providing
electronic service, storage and delivery of court-filed and discovery related documents
through a secure website.”).
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ment of liability under the Oil Pollution Act.249  The complaint also prayed
for unspecified injunctive relief.250  The complaint named the following de-
fendants: (1) BP as lessee, owner, operator and person in charge of the well,
and operator of the vessel; (2) Anadarko and MOEX as co-lessees of the
ocean block, and co-owners of the well; and (3) Transocean as owner and
operator of the drilling rig, and blowout preventer, and operator of the
well.251
In the Deepwater Horizon multi-district litigation, there were essentially
two categories of plaintiffs.  The government group included the United
States and the five Gulf coast states (Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Missis-
sippi, and Florida),252 and several local governments.253  The other plaintiff
group included private litigants such as individuals and businesses.254  As
called for by the Manual for Complex Litigation,255 the court appointed a
Plaintiff’s Steering Committee to represent all of the private litigants, as
well as many of the local governments.256  As for the sovereign govern-
ments, the court appointed “coordinating” counsel for the United States and
the states.257
249. Complaint of the United States of America, United States v. BP Expl. & Prod.
Inc., No. 10-4536 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010), Rec. Doc. 1 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2012);
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012)).
250. Id. at 26.
251. Id. at 5–13.
252. Alabama and Louisiana each filed complaints seeking damages. See, e.g., Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment at 1, Louisiana v. Triton Asset Leasing GmBH, No. 10-3059
(E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2010), Rec. Doc. 1; The State of Alabama’s First Amended Complaint,
Alabama v. BP, p.l.c., No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2011), Rec. Doc. 1872.  About
three years after the explosion, to avoid their claims being barred by the statute of limita-
tions, see 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f) (2015), Texas, Mississippi and Florida filed suit as well. See,
e.g., Complaint at 1, Texas v. BP Expl. & Prod., No. 13-315 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2013), Rec.
Doc. 1; Original Complaint at 1, Mississippi v. BP Expl. and Prod. Inc., No. 13-158 (S.D.
Miss. Apr. 18, 2013), Rec. Doc. 1; First Amended Complaint at 1, Florida v. BP Expl. &
Prod., Inc., No. 13-cv-123 (N.D. Fl. Apr. 20, 2013), Rec. Doc. 2.
253. Campbell Robertson et al., BP to Pay $18.7 Billion for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/bp-to-pay-gulf-coast-
states-18-7-billion-for-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill.html?_r=0.  Several cases were filed
against the United States outside of MDL 2179, but such claims are beyond the scope of this
article.
254. Pretrial Order No. 11, supra note 242, at 4. R
255. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004).
256. Pretrial Order No. 9 at 1–3, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8,
2010), Rec. Doc. 508.
257. Pretrial Order No. 26, supra note 239 (appointing Michael Underhill as coordinat- R
ing counsel for the Federal Government Interests and Alabama’s Attorney General as coordi-
nating counsel for the state interests).
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E. Pretrial Proceedings: Scope and Scale
Not surprisingly, given the scope of the disaster and the response to it,
pretrial activities in the MDL involved terabytes of data,258 hundreds of
hours of depositions, dozens of third party subpoenas, and numerous mo-
tions to compel.  The sheer volume of work was complicated by the fact
that the governments and private plaintiffs had to work together to present
a unified case to the trial judge, despite having asserted claims under differ-
ent laws.259  There were some theories of the case presented where not all
plaintiffs were in agreement.  For example, the private plaintiffs argued that
Halliburton was at fault for the cement job.  Conversely, the United States
emphasized BP’s control over all operations, including the cementing
work.260
Adding to the complexity, there were even times when the United
States and BP were aligned on issues.  For example, when Transocean
sought to have BP indemnify it for any civil penalties that the court might
award to the United States, BP and the United States both argued against
Transocean’s position, though for different reasons.261
Despite the breadth and complexity of the pretrial issues, even matters
of this size can be resolved in a “just, speedy, and [relatively] inexpensive”
manner when managed properly by the court and parties.262  Just such a
circumstance occurred in the Deepwater Horizon litigation. From the outset
of the litigation, the court established an aggressive schedule intended to
hold the trial on liability and limitation just shy of two years after the well
was finally capped.263  Accomplishment of this ambitious goal required ad-
herence to a set of principles which foreshadowed the December 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
258. One source estimates that a megabyte of computer storage can contain approxi-
mately 100 word processing pages. Michael R. Arkfeld, Arkfeld on Electronic Discovery and
Evidence § 1.2(G) tbl.1 (2d ed. LawPartner Publ’g LLC 2010).  A megabyte is a millionth of
a terabyte—indicating that a terabyte can contain approximately 100 million word processing
pages. See id. § 2.3(B).
259. See Pretrial Order No. 26, supra note 239. R
260. Transcript of Opening Statements at 51–58, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2013).
261. In re Oil Spill, 841 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 n.4 (E.D. La. 2012).
262. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
263. See Pretrial Order No. 32 at 4, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 3,
2011), Rec. Doc. 1506 (setting trial on liability for July 16, 2012); REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 1, at 167 (stating that static kill of the well was announced on August 8, 2010).
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1. Emphasis on Cooperation and Professionalism
From the first pretrial order issued by the court, Judge Barbier de-
manded a standard of cooperation and professionalism from the attorneys:
It is not yet known how many attorneys will eventually join this
litigation, but we can assume it will be a large number.  As attor-
neys involved in a multi-district case, you will probably be laboring
together for some time in the future with work progressively be-
coming more complicated and exacting.  Some of you know each
other and some are complete strangers.  Undoubtedly each has a
different style and personality.  It is likely that during the course of
this litigation your working relationship will occasionally be
strained, communication derailed, and mutual trust questioned.
The just and efficient resolution of this litigation will depend in
large measure on the way you as attorneys comport yourselves and
overcome the temptations and trepidations inherent in a case of
this magnitude.  The Manual for Complex Litigation recognizes
that judicial involvement in managing complex litigation does not
lessen the duties and responsibilities of the attorneys.  To the con-
trary, the added demands and burdens of this type of litigation
place a premium on professionalism and require counsel to fulfill
their obligations as advocates in a manner that will foster and sus-
tain good working relations among fellow counsel and the Court.
The Court expects, indeed insists, that professionalism and courte-
ous cooperation permeate this proceeding from now until this liti-
gation is concluded.264
Toward the end of achieving that cooperation and efficient work, Magistrate
Judge Sally J. Shushan held weekly status conferences to discuss the pro-
gress of discovery and other pretrial efforts.  Throughout these hearings,
Judge Shushan emphasized an esprit des corps among all counsel, and when
the prediction rang true that counsels’ working relationship occasionally be-
came strained, the court addressed such issues directly.265
The emphasis on cooperation went to the heart of managing the burden
of discovery on the parties and especially upon third parties.  Throughout
264. Pretrial Order No. 1 at 1–2 ¶ 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Aug.
10, 2010).
265. See Transcript of Status Conference at 6:25–12:24, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-
2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2014); Transcript of Status Conference at 10:17–12:19, In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MD-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2012), Rec. Doc. 7837 (Judge Shushan expressing
appreciation for the United States’ sharing a photograph of counsel in costume for
Halloween).
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discovery, the Magistrate Judge required the parties to coordinate in issuing
subpoenas, discovery requests, and even exhibit lists.266  When cooperation
failed, the court did not hesitate to rule quickly and definitively.  For in-
stance, the court held twice-weekly calls with the United States and BP
during the most intense document discovery, during which challenges to
the parties’ productions could be raised and addressed directly.267
2. Preservation of Evidence
Given the rapid onset of litigation after the explosion, preservation of
evidence was at the forefront of the court’s and parties’ minds from the
outset.  One of the first complex evidentiary issues to arise was the intersec-
tion of the efforts to seal the well and the need to preserve evidence of the
cause of the explosion.  On August 20, 2010, the court held a status confer-
ence by telephone regarding plans to make changes to the well in order to
facilitate the relief well construction.268  Eventually, the blowout preventer
was brought up from the sea floor and the court appointed a Special Master
(a former Coast Guard Captain) to oversee the preservation and examina-
tion of the blowout preventer in preparation for trial.269
Preservation of evidence and the cost of the preservation were early
issues for the United States as well.  One of the earliest filings by the
United States recognized the breadth of discovery and the potential burden
imposed by preservation of evidence.  Foreshadowing the recently imposed
requirement to discuss “any issues about preserving discoverable evi-
dence,”270 even before filing its complaint, the United States negotiated an
order addressing the preservation of electronically stored information.  This
negotiated order addressed issues that arise in nearly every litigation – such
as whether to preserve back-up tapes – and also issues unique to a case
involving the ongoing response to a major disaster – such as addressing data
266. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 20:08–22:16, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MD-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2012), Rec. Doc. 7837 (discussing coordination of subpoenas on
a number of third parties); Transcript of Status Conference at 25:05-31:17, In re Oil Spill,
No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. May 6, 2011), Rec. Doc. 2324 (discussing coordination of
responses to defendants’ discovery requests to the States).
267. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 30:17–32:03, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. May 11, 2012), Rec. Doc. 6527 (discussing challenges to the United
States’ privilege logs and referencing a follow-up “BP-US conference”).
268. Minute Entry, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2010), Rec.
Doc. 53.
269. See, e.g., Order Regarding the Appointment of Captain Suzanne E. Englebert, In re
Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2011), Rec. Doc. 4013.
270. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
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generated by employees deployed to the spill during their non-duty
hours.271
The United States led the efforts to minimize the burden of preserva-
tion of evidence throughout the litigation.  Because the response was ongo-
ing, numerous issues arose regarding the preservation of physical items
from the exploration of the well.  Commanding the most attention, of
course, was the preservation of the failed blow-out preventer.  The United
States worked with BP and the other parties to develop a protocol for rais-
ing the blow out preventer from the ocean floor, moving it to a base oper-
ated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, maintaining
the equipment over the next several years, and providing procedures for
access and inspection by the various experts who testified.272
In addition, issues related to the preservation of various biological,
plant, and environmental samples arose repeatedly.  The United States also
addressed these issues in a manner consistent with the Rule 26 mandate to
meet and confer regarding preservation.  To achieve judicial efficiency, to
the extent practicable, the United States developed procedures for consulta-
tion that resolved many issues without court intervention.  For instance, the
United States negotiated Pretrial Order 30, which permitted it to dispose of
samples if, after following a specified procedure, no other party objected.273
Where issues of spoliation did arise, the court used its own attention or
that of Special Masters to identify the prejudice and remedy it.  By focusing
on curing the prejudice rather than imposing sanctions, the court embodied
the spirit of the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.274
For example, in one incident, BP requested that Halliburton produce a se-
ries of modelling runs performed using a proprietary program.  These runs,
which were created by a retained expert witness after the closure of the
well, were missing from the expert’s computer when it was searched for
271. See Pretrial Order No. 22 at ¶ 14.a., In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
Jan. 4, 2011), Rec. Doc. 943 (relieving the United States of the obligation to preserve most
backup tapes); id. ¶ 17 (identifying when information collected by individual employees was
outside the possession, custody or control of the United States); see also Motion for Entry of
Order on Preservation of Evidence, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Dec. 24,
2010), Rec. Doc. 911 (setting forth reasons for order and history of negotiations).
272. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 98:05–124:03, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2011).
273. Pretrial Order No. 30, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2011),
Rec. Doc. 1378.
274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1); Summary of the Rep. of the Judicial Conference
Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc., Agenda E-19, at 15 (Sept. 2014) (emphasizing that the
Rule was being amended to provide “broad trial court discretion to cure prejudice caused by
the loss of” electronically stored information).
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discovery purposes.275  To replace the missing data, Judge Shushan assigned
a special master, Captain Englebert, to take possession of the computer and
supervise a forensic search for the files.276  The court also directed the par-
ties to cooperate in designing a protocol for the search and a method of
replicating the files.277  Judge Shushan supervised this process and inquired
at each status conference regarding the progress until the issue was re-
solved.278  As a result of the court’s efforts, the prejudice alleged by BP was
cured and any disruption of the litigation was averted.
3. Introducing Efficiencies into Document
and Data Discovery
The court also introduced a number of procedures that significantly
streamlined the document production.  These procedures were drawn from
or inspired by the Manual for Complex Litigation.279  For instance, because
determining the cause of the explosion and blowout required examination of
the design of the well and blowout preventer, many parties sought discovery
of information that is typically held as highly confidential business informa-
tion.  Similarly, discovery related to damages included information that
contained health records and other personally identifying information.  Fur-
ther, because some parties were seeking to establish negligence by showing
BP deviated from the general standard of care, BP sought discovery of the
well designs and other information regarding its competitors’ drilling activi-
ties.280  All of this information was highly sensitive and if simplifying steps
had not been taken, would have required page-by-page review of millions of
pages of documents.
This problem was recognized in the Manual for Complex Litigation
when it advised courts that, courts should consider an “umbrella” protective
order when the volume of potentially relevant materials is large.281  Such
orders:
[P]rovide that all assertedly confidential material disclosed (and ap-
propriately identified, usually by stamp) is presumptively protected
275. In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179, 2012 WL 174645, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2012).
276. Id.
277. Id. at *2.
278. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 24:22–25:01, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2012).
279. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 11.41–.49 (2004).
280. See, e.g., United States’ Status Report on Efforts to Respond to Discovery Served
on It Before July 10, 2011 at Attachment 2, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
Sept. 6, 2011), Rec. Doc. 3928 [hereinafter U.S. Status Report on Discovery] (identifying
requests from BP for documents relating to various aspects of well design).
281. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 (2004).
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unless challenged.  Such orders typically are made without a partic-
ularized showing to support the claim for protection, but such a
showing must be made whenever a claim under an order is
challenged.282
Early on, Judge Barbier did what the Manual suggested and entered an
umbrella protective order allowing the parties to exchange sensitive infor-
mation under seal.283  When the United States joined the litigation, a sup-
plemental order was entered to address statutes that imposed unique
obligations on the United States, such as the Privacy Act and statutes gov-
erning the locations of fishing grounds, oil deposits, and other sensitive
information.284
While this procedure allowed the parties to produce a great deal of
information rapidly, it did introduce challenges in an environmental en-
forcement action.  Each of the statutes under which the United States
brought suit were premised on the importance of public access to informa-
tion and participation in enforcement.  For instance, the Clean Water Act
provides opportunities for parties to intervene in an enforcement action,
and the regulations of the Department of Justice require public notice and
comment on any settlements resolving claims under that statute.285  The
court addressed this dissonance directly at the time of trial when the parties
were ordered to review all documents that were held as confidential under
the pretrial orders and redact or otherwise remove the confidential informa-
tion to allow the trial to proceed publicly.286  Though reviewing the docu-
ments marked as exhibits was time-consuming—BP’s exhibit list for the first
282. Id.
283. See Pretrial Order No. 13, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 2,
2010), Rec. Doc. 641.
284. See Pretrial Order No. 36, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. May 16,
2011), Rec. Doc. 2376.
285. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2016); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.9
(“There is, moreover, a strong presumption against closing proceedings or portions
thereof.”).  One party, the Center for Biological Diversity, sued BP and Transocean under
the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act, alleging that the companies had violated
the Act by discharging the oil into the ocean without a permit. See Center for Biological
Diversity v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2013).  The Center later
added claims pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
alleging that the companies failed to timely and accurately report the release of hazardous
substances. Id. at 419.  The court eventually dismissed these claims and the Fifth Circuit
upheld the dismissal of all but the notification claims. Id. at 432.
286. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 29:22–32:13, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2012), Rec. Doc. 5799.
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trial was 268 pages long287—it was certainly less time consuming that re-
viewing all documents before their production.
Both the Manual for Complex Litigation and the court also recognized
the issues that led the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to propose Rule 502—the burdens imposed by page-by-page review
for privilege.288  The Manual advises courts to develop “procedures to ac-
commodate claims of privilege or for protection of materials from discovery
as trial preparation materials.”289  Without such procedures, privilege claims
can easily disrupt the discovery schedule.290
In the case at bar, the court took several steps to address privilege
claims.  First, the court entered an order implementing the provisions of
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), i.e., an order that permitted parties to
claw back privileged documents that were inadvertently produced.291  In
addition, upon the parties’ agreement, that claw back order included the
following provision:
Privilege log identification is not required for post-April 20, 2010
communications exchanged between the Producing Party and their
counsel or among counsel for the Producing Party.  In addition,
neither communications between or among counsel for Plaintiffs
nor communications between or among counsel for Defendants are
required to be identified on the Producing Party’s privilege log.292
In doing so, the court eliminated the wasteful logging of documents that
were very unlikely to raise a question in the parties’ minds, conserving the
parties’ efforts to focus on more contentious assertions of privilege.293
287. BP Phase One “Good Faith” Trial Exhibit List, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MD-2179
(E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2011), Rec. Doc. 4585.
288. FED. R. EVID. 502, Adv. Comm. Note (stating that the new rule “responds to the
widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of attorney-
client privilege or work product have become prohibitive”).
289. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.43 (2004).
290. Id.
291. Pretrial Order No. 14 at 3–6 ¶¶ 6–10, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MD-2179 (E.D. La.
Nov. 3, 2010), Rec. Doc. 655; see also FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
292. Pretrial Order No. 14, supra note 291, at 2 ¶ 2. R
293. While the Court’s procedures definitely introduced efficiency into this process, the
parties still expended a great deal of effort addressing privilege issues.  For instance, the
United States and BP negotiated a procedure to address BP’s challenges to the assertion of
the deliberative process privilege that ultimately reduced the number of claims to 119 docu-
ments and BP’s challenge to only 21 of those claims.  Ultimately, each of the United States’
challenged deliberative process claims was upheld. In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179, 2012
WL 2087219, at *2 (E.D. La. Jun. 11, 2012).  Another privilege dispute arose regarding BP’s
assertion of attorney-client privilege over documents that the United States claimed were
subject to waiver as a result of the crime-fraud doctrine.  United States’ Motion to Compel
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4. The Actual Exchange of Data and Documents
Though the events at issue in this case took place over a relatively short
period of time—most parties agreed to limit the majority of discovery to the
period of 2005-2015294—the amount of documents and data exchanged in
this case was massive.  As the primary operator of the well and the entity
participating in the response, BP was an obvious target of discovery.  Per-
haps also somewhat obviously, the United States was also a target of mas-
sive discovery because of its role in leasing the Macondo well to BP,
responding to the spill, enforcing the law, and providing substantial scien-
tific expertise regarding the Gulf of Mexico and oil drilling.
As expected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,295 the parties ad-
dressed the format of production early on in discovery.296  Cooperation at
the beginning of discovery streamlined the production and allowed all of the
parties to use standard e-discovery document review platforms.
Despite the United States’, and all the parties’, efforts to reduce the
burden of discovery, the exchange of data was still extensive.  In the liability
phase, alone, the United States was served with over 500 requests for ad-
mission, over 70 interrogatories, and more than 200 requests for produc-
tions of documents.297  Ultimately, more than ten federal agencies produced
over one hundred million pages.298
Production of Previously Withheld Documents Pursuant to the Crime-Fraud Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (Jan. 30, 2013), Rec. Doc.
8417.  The United States’ motion was granted in part. See Order, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2013), Rec. Doc. 9115.
294. See, e.g., U.S. Status Report on Discovery, supra note 280, at 3, Attachment 4.
295. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), 34.
296. See Pretrial Order No. 16, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 8,
2010), Rec. Doc. 686.
297. U.S. Status Report Discovery, supra note 280, at Attachments 1–2.
298. Email from Cynthia Vide, Lead Project Manager, CACI, to Sarah Himmelhoch,
Senior Litig. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Env’t & Nat. Res. Div. (Sept. 27, 2013, 4:44
EST) (identifying a total production of over 97 million pages).  In Phases 1 and 2, the
following federal agencies responded to discovery: Department of the Interior, Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Department of Energy and seven National Laboratories, Department
of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Commerce and the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of the Navy, and the Army
Corps of Engineers.  In addition, the United States collected and produced documents from
several independent volunteers who participated in the response. See U.S. Status Report on
Discovery, supra note 280, at 4–23. In Phase 3, the United States provided additional docu-
ments from these same agencies and also collected documents from the Department of
Health and Human Services, Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Labor.
See United States’ Response to Defendants’ First Set of Discovery Requests to the United
States Relating to the Penalty Phase at 38, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (Apr. 25,
2014); Letter from Sarah Himmelhoch, Senior Litig. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Env’t &
Nat. Res. Div. to Sally Shushan, U.S. Magistrate Judge (July 11, 2014).
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The most successful effort to address the burden of discovery was un-
dertaken in the third phase of discovery.  The court was faced with a special
challenge in this phase that related to, among other things, the seriousness
of BP’s and Anadarko’s violations, including the nature and extent of envi-
ronmental harm.  At the same time, the United States was engaged in a
substantial assessment of these environmental harms, which would likely
result in a future claim for natural resource damages.  BP sought to conduct
significant discovery into the environmental impact of its spill, and the
United States opposed such efforts in order to protect the integrity of the
natural resource damages assessment.  As the court recognized in the first
penalty phase status conference:
[I]t seems to me that if I went along with BP’s suggestion as to how
we should approach and allow discovery on this, we’d in effect, be
discovering and trying the [natural resources damages] case; and as
we all know, that could be years away before a case is ready to be
tried.299
The court, in the spirit of the judicial involvement contemplated by the
Manual for Complex Litigation and 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,300 addressed this tension directly.  First, the court in-
vited and quickly disposed of numerous motions in limine defining the scope
of the third trial, thereby providing clear guidance to the parties on the
appropriate scope of discovery.301  Second, the court directed the involve-
ment of the Magistrate Judge in the planning of written discovery.302  Judge
Shushan directed the parties to exchange draft discovery,303 after which the
parties held an in person meet and confer.  During that meeting, the parties
addressed the scope of discovery and prepared a much narrower and more
efficient exchange of documents and data for the final phase of the
litigation.
This early exchange of discovery was remarkably similar to that con-
templated by the amendments to Rule 26 that became effective on Decem-
299. Transcript of Status Conference, supra note 265, at 66:14–19. R
300. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10 (2004) (“Fair and efficient resolution
of complex litigation requires at least that (1) the court exercise early and effective supervi-
sion (and, where necessary, control) . . . .”); ROBERTS, supra note 222, at 10 (“Judges must be R
willing to take on a stewardship role, managing their cases from the outset rather than al-
lowing parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of litigation.”)
301. See generally Transcript of Status Conference, supra note 265, at 13:20–85:08. R
302. Id. at 12:25–13:05.
303. See, e.g., Email from Sarah Himmelhoch, Senior Litig. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Env’t & Nat. Res. Div. to Sally Shushan, U.S. Magistrate Judge (Apr. 4, 2014, 2:53
EST).
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ber 15, 2015.  As the drafters of the amendments recognized, early exchange
of discovery requests “is designed to facilitate focused discussion” between
the parties and “may produce changes in the requests.”304  This expectation
was proven correct by the discovery procedures implemented by the court
in the third phase of the Deepwater Horizon discovery.
One last aspect of discovery related to documents and data is worth
discussing. BP—the party held liable by the court for the violations—pro-
duced substantially less information than the United States.  For instance,
compared to the United States’ two million documents in Phase 3, BP pro-
duced roughly 258,000 documents.305  Such statistics demonstrate that even
with close supervision of the court, a large company with the right resources
can demand disproportionate discovery in an effort to make civil environ-
mental enforcement too burdensome for the governmental agencies.  This
case shows, however, that with focus by the government and the court on
clear communication, well-defined standards for production, and the use of
electronic tools, no company is beyond the reach of appropriate environ-
mental enforcement.306
5. Depositions
Yet another challenge both in volume and complexity in the Deepwater
Horizon civil litigation was depositions.  Collectively, the parties conducted
over five hundred days of fact depositions during discovery.  These individ-
uals who were deposed ranged from BP and Transocean employees who
witnessed those first few horrifying moments of the explosion,307 corporate
representatives for third party contractors involved in the drilling,308 to an
304. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d) advisory committee note to 2015 amendment.
305. Himmelhoch, supra note 298, at 41 tbl.3.  This discovery imbalance proved more R
difficult but not insurmountable for the state governments.  For instance, BP brought a
motion to compel against the State of Louisiana, which resulted in an order providing for
monetary sanctions and potential case terminating sanctions if the State missed specific dis-
covery deadlines. In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179, 2011 WL 5110046, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct.
27, 2011).  As evidenced by the fact that Louisiana is part of the global settlement, Louisiana
was able to overcome this obstacle and get justice for its citizens.
306. See, e.g., Order Regarding the Protocol for Production of Documents from the
U.S.’s Zantaz Archive, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MD-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2012), Rec. Doc.
5293.
307. See, e.g., Nick Watson Deposition, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jul.
14, 2011).
308. See, e.g., Ruben Schulkes Deposition, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
Nov. 12, 2012).
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expert witness on topics such as drilling safety, measuring the flow of oil,
the impacts of the spill,309 and more.
This challenge was recognized by the Manual for Complex Litigation,
which states that depositions “are often overused and conducted inef-
ficiently [therefore] [t]he judge should manage the litigation so as to avoid
unnecessary depositions, limit the number and length of those that are
taken, and ensure that the process of taking depositions is as fair and effi-
cient as possible.”310
As with document discovery, Judge Barbier and Judge Shushan actively
monitored the process of depositions and with the leadership of the main
parties, including the United States, introduced significant efficiencies in
the deposition procedure.  The court:
1) Made it clear that each individual would only be subject to a
single deposition (absent specific court order);311
2) Specified which counsel would question the witnesses;312
3) Limited speaking objections by providing very specific direc-
tions on how to object;313
4) Discouraged unnecessary attendance at deposition;314
5) Required the parties to agree on methods for telephonic at-
tendance at deposition and internet based monitoring of
depositions;315
6) Required completion of document production related to each
witness before the deposition of that witness occurred;316
7) Specified how witnesses could assert the Fifth Amendment
where necessary;317
8) Specified the presumptive locations of depositions;318
9) Provided direct oversight of depositions where necessary;319
309. See, e.g., Alan Huffman Deposition, Vol. 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D.
La. Nov. 16, 2011).
310. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.45 (2004).
311. Pretrial Order No. 17 at 9, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 16,
2010), Rec. Doc. 740.
312. Id. at 3.
313. Id. at 7.
314. Id. at 2.
315. See id. at 8–9.
316. Id. at 10–11.
317. See Order Regarding Invocation of the Fifth Amendment, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. May 27, 2011), Rec. Doc. 2555.
318. Pretrial Order No. 17, supra note 311, at 4. R
319. See Transcript of Status Conference at 23:23–25, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2011).
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10) Established the distribution of time among the parties and the
order of questioning for each deposition;320
11) Required coordination of subpoenas to third parties;321 and
12) Required coordination of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of the
parties.322
Without these careful procedures, depositions of individuals already trau-
matized by the event itself could have become a chaotic mess of overlapping
and competing interests.  The safeguards and ground rules, however, mini-
mized these challenges.323
The parties, too, invested in measures that maximized the usability of
the depositions.  The parties retained a single court reporting firm, which
allowed the reporters to become familiar with the terms and issues in the
case and improved the accuracy of transcripts.  All depositions were video-
taped and the court reporter provided iPads in the room for parties to fol-
low the real-time transcription.  In addition, the court reporter allowed
remote access monitoring of the depositions, which allowed parties to coor-
dinate with attorneys not present in the room during the breaks, thereby
reducing the number of attorneys who had to be physically present at the
deposition.  Finally, the majority of the depositions were taken in a single
building with spacious conference rooms that allowed parties not directly
questioning the witnesses to sit at separate tables, reducing the number of
lawyers at the table at any one time—and presumably reducing the stress of
deposition on witnesses not used to the procedure.324
F. Summary Judgment Ruling
Judge Barbier recognized the principle enunciated by the Manual for
Complex Litigation that “[m]otions practice can be a source of substantial
320. See Order Regarding the Allocation of Time for Deposition of Richard Morrison,
In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2011), Rec. Doc. 4028.
321. Transcript of Status Conference at 64:21–69:22, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2011), Rec. Doc. 1556.
322. Id.
323. One of the interesting issues that arose involved the proposed deposition of Donald
Vidrine, the BP well-site manager.  In response to requests for information and his deposi-
tion, Mr. Vidrine asserted that he was unable to appear for deposition or respond to written
questions because of a medical condition.  As a result, his deposition was postponed once.
When Transocean subpoenaed him for deposition at a later date, the Court ordered Mr.
Vidrine to undergo an examination by a court appointed psychiatrist, a decision that Mr.
Vidrine appealed to the Fifth Circuit. See All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., 505 Fed. Appx. 355 (5th Cir. 2013).  Though the Fifth Circuit dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, Mr. Vidrine was successful in avoiding his deposition.
324. The description in this paragraph is based on the personal observations of Steve
O’Rourke and Sarah Himmelhoch.
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cost and delay.”325  Accordingly, he imposed measures to control motions
practice.  For instance, he entered an order staying the response to all mo-
tions until the court issued a scheduling order.326  In doing so, he allowed
the parties to avoid filing motions for extensions or even responses to obvi-
ously deficient motions.  Similarly, both Judge Barbier and Judge Shushan
consistently imposed and enforced page limits and joint briefings.327
Most importantly for ensuring an efficient resolution of all the claims,
Judge Barbier and Judge Shushan abided by the Manual’s advice that
“[p]rompt rulings . . . will often help avoid unnecessary litigation activ-
ity.”328  For instance, the summary judgment ruling discussed below was
issued just thirty-two days after the completion of briefing and argu-
ment.329  In all, the court disposed of many substantive motions before be-
ginning trial.330  This article will focus on those rulings most directly
related to civil environmental enforcement.
One of the most significant pretrial rulings with respect to the United
States’ claims resolved both substantive legal questions of import and also
allowed an efficient trial of liability.  Specifically, the United States moved
for partial summary judgment, claiming that BP, the Anadarko entities, and
the Transocean entities were strictly liable under the Clean Water Act and
the Oil Pollution Act.331  The Anadarko entities and Transocean entities
cross-moved for summary judgment that they were not liable.332  Resolu-
tion of these motions had procedural implications because Anadarko had
made a demand for a jury trial.333  If their liability for the United States’
325. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.31 (2004).
326. See Pretrial Order No. 15, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 5,
2010), Rec. Doc. 676.
327. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial at 2335:12–2336:23, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2015).
328. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.32 (2004).
329. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. La. 2012) (deciding the summary judg-
ment motions on February 22, 2012).
330. See Minute Entry, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2012), Rec.
Doc. 5304 (stating that oral argument on the summary judgment motions was held that day).
Judge Shushan also speedily addressed motions and encouraged oral argument in place of
written briefs. Id.  The lengths to which the court went to ensure motions were resolved
quickly to avoid complicating the case is demonstrated by Judge Shushan’s remark that she
did not “mind reading paper while I eat my [Thanksgiving] turkey.” Transcript of Status
Conference at 28:17–29:12, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2011), Rec.
Doc. 4787.
331. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 748.
332. Id.
333. See In re Oil Spill, 98 F. Supp. 3d 872, 877 (E.D. La. 2015) (“When a claim is
within admiralty jurisdiction and also within some other federal subject matter jurisdiction,
the plaintiff may designate whether the claim is in admiralty or not . . . . One important
consequence of the Rule 9(h) election is whether there is a right to a jury trial, as admiralty
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claims was established in summary judgment, that would allow the court to
try the remaining issues of liability for negligence alleged by the private
parties and the penalty enhancement for gross negligence together without
a jury.334  Hence, the court acted quickly to resolve the substantive issue.
The Clean Water Act imposes liability on “[a]ny person who is the
owner, operator, or person in charge of any vessel, onshore facility, or off-
shore facility from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged.”335
Courts have routinely held that the Clean Water Act imposes strict
liability.336
In its motion, the United States sought to hold Transocean, BP, and
Anadarko liable as “owner[s]” under the Clean Water Act.  Though there
was a legal basis to hold the parties liable as operators as well, due to
Anadarko’s role as an investing partner—which Anadarko labeled a “non-
operating” partner—the U.S. did not allege that APC was either an “opera-
tor” or a “person in charge.”337
There was no question of fact that oil came from an under-ground res-
ervoir, through the well, then through the blowout preventer, then into the
water.  There was no question that BP and Anadarko owned the well, while
Transocean owned the blowout preventer.338  Thus, liability devolved to a
pure question of applying the law to those facts, which turned out to be
surprisingly complicated: BP and Anadarko argued that the oil was dis-
charged from the blowout preventer, not from the well (thus, they were not
cases are traditionally tried to the bench.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)); Luera v. M/V
Alberta, 635 F.3d 181, 188 (5th Cir. 2011).  There was briefing about whether that jury
demand was valid, but due to the entry of summary judgment, the substantive ruling was not
required.
334. On appeal, Anadarko argued that its Seventh Amendment rights were violated by
the court’s granting of summary judgment to the United States.  The Fifth Circuit rejected
that argument. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 772 F. 3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2014).
335. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (2012).  Such a discharge must involve “such quantities
as may be harmful,” with harmful quantities having been administratively established to
include any discharge that “cause[s] a film or sheen or discoloration of the surface of the
water or adjoining shorelines or cause[s] a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the
surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines.” 40 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2015); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Yost, 919 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1990).
336. See, e.g., Santa Monica Baykeeper v. Intl. Metals Ekco, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 2d 936,
940 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Pub. Interest Research Grp. of NJ, Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc.,
817 F. Supp. 1164, 1178 (D. N.J. 1993) (citing Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer
Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368,
374 (10th Cir. 1979)).
337. See Plaintiff United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of United States’
Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Liability of BP Exploration &
Production Inc., the Transocean Defendants, and the Anadarko Defendants at 1–2, 6–11,
22–26, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2011), Rec. Doc. 4836-1.
338. Id. at 1–4.
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liable);339  Transocean argued that the oil was discharged from the well, not
from the blowout preventer (BOP) (and thus, it was not liable);340 and the
United States argued that the oil came from the well and also from the
BOP (and thus, all three were liable).341  This was an issue of first
impression.
From this menu, the court selected Transocean’s position.342  The court
reasoned that the oil was discharged from the well, that BP and the
Anadarko entities owned the well, and that they were thus strictly liable.343
Given the amount in controversy, it is not surprising that BP and Anadarko
filed an interlocutory appeal.  A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, in a lengthy opinion adopting Judge Barbier’s reasoning.344  BP and
APC sought en banc review, and filed a string of supplemental briefs.  The
same three-judge panel took the fairly unusual step of issuing its own “sup-
plemental” opinion.345  Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit denied en banc re-
view by the narrow margin of seven opposed to six in favor, and five of the
dissenting judges issued a written dissent.346  The two defendants peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was denied.347  Denial of
certiorari is unsurprising given the procedural posture: this was an interloc-
utory appeal of partial summary judgment, in a matter in which the court
339. See BP Exploration & Production Inc.’s Opposition to the United States’ Second
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Liability of BP Exploration & Production
Inc., The Transocean Defendants, and The Anadarko Defendants at 15–17, In re Oil Spill,
No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012) Rec. Doc. 5124; Anadarko’s Combined Memoran-
dum of Law: (1) In Opposition to the Plaintiff United States’ Second Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to the Liability of BP Exploration and Production, Inc., the Trans-
ocean Defendants, and the Anadarko Defendants (Rec. Doc. 4836); and (2) In Support of
Anadarko’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Anadarko’s Non-Liability Under the
CWA at 5–9, In re Oil Spill, 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012), Rec. Doc. 5113-2.
340. Transocean Defendants’: (1) Opposition to United States’ Second Motion For Par-
tial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 4820); (2) Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that
the Transocean Defendants Are Not Liable Under OPA or the Clean Water Act with Re-
spect to the Underwater Discharge of Oil from the Macondo Well and (3) Combined Memo-
randum of Law at 9–13, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2013), Rec. Doc.
5103.
341. United States’ Combined Memorandum Re: (1) Reply in Support of Second Mo-
tion of United States for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability [4820] and (2) Opposi-
tion to Anadarko’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement [5113], and (3) Opposition to
Transocean’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [5103 at 2–10, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 2012), Rec. Doc. 5214.
342. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 757–61 (E.D. La. 2012).
343. Id.
344. In re Deepwater Horizon, 753 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2014).
345. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 772 F.3d 350, 350 (5th Cir. 2014).
346. In re Deepwater Horizon, 775 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2015).
347. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2893 (2015); Anadarko Petro-
leum Corp. v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2891 (2015).
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had already held several trials, issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law on Phase One, and scheduled the penalty phase trial.  Final judgment in
the matter was years away.
As to Transocean, the court reasoned that its blowout preventer was
only a passive conduit for the oil and that Transocean was thus not liable as
owner of the blowout preventer (leaving open the question of whether
Transocean was liable as “operator” of the well itself).348  The judge, in a
separate ruling, later found Transocean liable as an operator.349
The United States appealed the denial of summary judgment as to
Transocean’s liability.  Before the appeal was even briefed, the United
States and Transocean settled the Clean Water Act penalty claim,350 and the
United States dropped its appeal of the summary judgment ruling.
G. Trial
Trial of the United States’ claims took place in three phases over three
years, and two of the phases were tried jointly with the claims of private
parties seeking punitive damages under the General Maritime Law.351  De-
termining whether and how much of a penalty would be assessed upon BP
and the other defendants was thus a multi-step analysis: (1) establishing
liability; (2) determining whether there was gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct; (3) determining how many barrels were discharged; and (4) deter-
mining a final penalty amount after applying the eight statutory penalty
factors.  As it turned out, in the case of U.S. v. BP, step (1) was handled on
summary judgment, step (2) was the Phase One trial, step (3) was the Phase
Two Trial, and step (4) was the Phase Three Trial.  Once the Clean Water
Act penalty was determined, absent the settlement, the parties would then
have turned to determining the natural resource damages.
1. Conduct of All Three Trials
Before turning to the substantive trial issues, it is important to recog-
nize that Judge Barbier again demonstrated the effectiveness of the proce-
348. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (E.D. La. 2012) (noting that Transocean is
not liable because the equipment they owned was merely passive conduits through which oil
flowed).
349. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 756 (E.D. La. 2014).
350. Partial Consent Decree Between the Plaintiff United States of America and De-
fendants Triton Asset Leasing Gmbh, Transocean Holdings LLC, Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling Inc., and Transocean Deepwater Inc., In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2013), Rec. Doc. 8608 (requiring Transocean to pay $1 billion as a civil
penalty, along with extensive injunctive requirements related to drilling safety).
351. See Third Amended Pretrial Order No. 41, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D.
La. Oct. 31, 2012), Rec. Doc. 7810.
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dures recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation in conducting
each trial.  The Manual for Complex Litigation gives specific direction on a
number of aspects of trial, the wisdom of each was demonstrated by Judge
Barbier’s administration of the Deepwater Horizon trial.  First, the Manual
advises that a “trial schedule is essential to the orderly conduct of a trial”
and recommends consideration of time limits on the trial or examination, as
well as clear instructions regarding the start and end of each court day and
on which days trial would be held.352  Before each trial phase, the court
discussed the question of when trial would occur, where parties would have
space to work, and even designed a seating chart for the first two trials to
ensure all parties had fair access in the courtroom.353
In the first phase of trial, the court did not impose specific time limits
on witnesses or the total trial time.  This decision is not surprising, given
the number of parties and issues to be decided.  In the later phases, how-
ever, the court imposed limits on the number of witnesses and trial time.354
The experience of the lawyers involved was that such limits provided neces-
sary focus to the trial presentations and reduced the gamesmanship involved
in cross-examination.
Judge Barbier also embraced the use of an electronic courtroom, which
significantly expedited the trial and provided ready access to the large num-
ber of lawyers and spectators in attendance.  For the first phase of the trial,
the use of an electronic courtroom also allowed the use of overflow court-
rooms where non-essential attendees or spectators who could not find seats
in the main courtroom could observe the proceedings.  The parties’ produc-
tion of discovery in electronic form made the use of an electronic courtroom
much easier because each party could use off-the-shelf software to call up,
highlight, and display exhibits.  In this bench trial, the use of electronic
exhibits that could be enlarged and highlighted increased the speed at which
relevant text could be called out and discussed by the witnesses.355
Judge Barbier and Judge Shushan also expedited the trial by handling
the technical admission of exhibits through an out of court procedure.  Prior
to trial, counsel exchanged written exhibit lists and exchanged objections to
the documents listed on opposing parties’ lists.  At trial, documents would
be called up and used during testimony, but the parties and court would
confirm formal admission of exhibits in a “marshalling” process.  Specifi-
352. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 12.12 (2004).
353. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference, supra note 265, at 85:23–92:18; see MAN- R
UAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 12.12 (2004).
354. See, e.g., Order Regarding Presentation of Evidence in Phase Two Trial, In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2013), Rec. Doc. 11087.
355. The description in this paragraph is based on the personal observation of all the
authors.
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cally, at the end of each day, the parties would confer and agree upon the
documents that had been used, those that had been objected to, and those
that could be admitted.  The next morning, the proffering party would then
offer a list and copy of the exhibits to the court for admission.  At the
conclusion of each trial, the court held a final marshalling conference at
which the parties resolved any lingering issues regarding the admission of
evidence.  Accordingly, valuable trial time was not consumed with detailed
arguments over the admissibility of particular documents.356
Judge Barbier also took full advantage of the efficiencies that could be
gained in a bench trial.  For instance, witnesses who were scheduled to pro-
vide both direct and rebuttal testimony were required to testify only once.
That simplified the scheduling of expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs
– though it did lead to a little court room drama as the expert had to charac-
terize the opposing parties’ evidence in order to place his or her rebuttal
testimony in context.  Similarly, because Judge Barbier, as an experienced
judge, was fully capable of distinguishing between demonstratives and ex-
hibits, the use of demonstratives was more liberal and detailed than typical
of a jury trial.  Most expert witnesses presented their testimony using a
series of PowerPoint; like slides that summarized the opinions being offered
and cited to the source evidence.  This allowed quicker presentation of the
evidence while also providing the court with a handy outline for review
later as it prepared its findings of fact.357  The United States and the other
plaintiffs made these slides and all of the trial exhibits available on a website
after each day of trial.358
2. Phase One: Allocation of Fault and Determination of
Gross Negligence and Willful Misconduct
The first phase of the trial addressed the events from April 20-22, 2010
and determined which of the various parties acted with negligence, gross
negligence, willful misconduct, or were otherwise at fault, and allocated that
356. The description in this paragraph is based on the personal observation of all the
authors.  The court also modified the procedures as additional efficiencies were identified.
For instance, in the first phase, the parties did not separately number the pages of exhibits,
which sometimes led to confusion as to the specific page being used.  Similarly, the parties
had not agreed upon a uniform numbering system for demonstrative exhibits in the first
phase.  For the second and third phases of trial, therefore, the parties and court agreed on a
uniform number system for the pages of trial exhibits and demonstrative exhibits.
357. This paragraph is drawn from the personal experience of the lawyers present at
trial, including Steve O’Rourke and Sarah Himmelhoch.
358. See Transcript of Trial at 23:12–17, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La.
Feb. 23, 2013) (discussing the procedure for posting exhibits and other documents to www
.mdl2179trialdocs.com).
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fault among the various parties.359  This first phase of the trial was the
longest, with twenty-nine trial days in 2013.360  While the private party
plaintiffs sought to establish liability for punitive damages under the Gen-
eral Maritime Law, the United States was trying the issue of whether the
penalty enhancement due to “gross negligence or willful misconduct” ap-
plies to BP’s conduct.
The United States presented two theories.  First, the United States
presented witnesses who demonstrated the failure to properly interpret the
negative pressure tests that occurred before the explosion in and of itself
was gross negligence.361  In an alternative theory, the United States
presented evidence that the accumulation of poor decision-making by BP
throughout the drilling of the well caused the explosion.362  In sum, the
United States provided expert witnesses who testified regarding the careless
approach that BP brought to the well.  As Donald Huffman, one of the
United States’ experts testified, many of BP’s decisions were “totally unsafe
and dangerous.”363
In its ruling on the first phase of trial, the court agreed with both theo-
ries.  The 153-page decision, issued in 2014, found BP guilty of gross negli-
gence and willful misconduct, meaning BP was subject to the higher
penalties under the Clean Water Act.364  The gross negligence finding
against BP was a tremendous victory for the plaintiffs.  In the author’s view,
the court recognized the seriousness of the violation because of BP’s lack of
due care and made it likely that the penalty would be in the billions of
dollars.365
The Phase One ruling also resolved numerous other legal and factual
issues related to the private parties.  For example, the court found two other
corporate defendants, Transocean and Halliburton, liable for ordinary negli-
gence.366  BP was apportioned sixty-seven percent of the blame for the oil
spill.367  Transocean was apportioned 30 percent of the blame and
359. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 668 (E.D. La. 2014) (noting that Phase One
was known as the “Incident Phase”).
360. In re Oil Spill, 77 F Supp. 3d 500, 503 ¶ 4 (E.D. La 2015).
361. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, supra note 358, at 73:20–78:05 (outlining the United
States’ evidence regarding the negative pressure test in its opening statement).
362. See, e.g., id. at 78:01–82:08.
363. Transcript of Trial at 670:05–15, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Feb.
27, 2013).
364. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
365. BP had appealed that finding, but in light of the settlement, the appeal was dis-
missed in 2016. Memorandum to All Parties re Dismissal of Appeal, In re Deepwater Hori-
zon, No. 13-31374 (5th Cir. Jul. 7, 2016).
366. In re Oil Spill, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 756–57.
367. Id. at 747.
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Haliburton was apportioned the remaining three percent of the blame.368
The court also found that BP’s conduct was so egregious that punitive dam-
ages under the General Maritime Law were appropriate; however, such
damages could not be imposed due to the Fifth Circuit’s legal requirement
that the conduct must have involved certain high-level corporate officials to
qualify.369  All other defendants were dismissed.370
3. Trial Phase Two: Number of Barrels
The second phase of trial focused on the events from April 22, 2010
until the closure of the well and ultimately addressed two issues: were the
defendants negligent with respect to the response actions, and what was the
amount of oil discharged into the Gulf of Mexico?371
Judge Barbier divided the second phase trial into two segments.  In the
first segment, the private plaintiffs presented evidence regarding the de-
fendants’ conduct during the response actions.  The United States did not
participate in any significant way in this segment.372  The private parties
argued that BP and the other defendants had been negligent in their re-
sponse to the oil spill after April 22, 2010.373
The second segment of the trial focused on a narrow but significant
issue for the United States’ claims—how many barrels of oil were discharged
to the environment.  As described above, the statutory maximum penalty
under the Clean Water Act is determined in large part by the number of
barrels of oil discharged (coupled, of course, with whether the conduct was
grossly negligent).374
Because this spill was unprecedented and occurred a mile under the
surface of the ocean through an uncontrolled hole with no monitor attached,
the question of how many barrels were actually discharged was hotly con-
tested.  The United States offered the testimony of two senior scientists at
the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories, as well as several ex-
perts from the oil exploration industry.375  BP and Anadarko countered
368. Id.
369. Id. at 757.
370. Id. at 669.
371. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d 500, 503 ¶ 5(E.D. La. 2015).
372. Participants in the Source Control segment were the “Aligned Parties” on one side
– private plaintiffs, the States of Alabama and Louisiana, the Transocean entities, and Halli-
burton Energy Services, Inc. – and the BP entities on the other. Id. at 504 (Phase Two
Findings of Fact).  Meanwhile, the parties to the Quantification segment were the United
States as plaintiff and BPXP and Anadarko Petroleum Corporation as defendants. Id. at 522.
373. Id. at 516 ¶ 215 (“The Aligned Parties contend there were two major flaws relative
to source control that delayed the successful capping of the well.”).
374. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
375. In re Oil Spill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 522.
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with evidence from several experts of their own (such as geologists and
professors of petroleum engineering).376  The United States estimated that
4.19 million barrels of oil was discharged, but BP argued the actual amount
was 2.45 million barrels of oil discharged.377
After reviewing the evidence from the two week trial, the court found
that the issue was extremely complicated, but that his best estimate was that
3.19 million barrels had been discharged for purposes of calculating the
maximum possible civil penalty under the CWA.378
The court also found that “arguably” a factfinder could conclude that
BP acted with negligence in failing to close in the well for three months,379
it could not be held liable for punitive damages for failures in its response
actions;380 the plaintiffs appealed that finding.
4. Phase Three: Determining the Penalty Amount
Having issued findings on the first two phases of trial, the court had
found all the facts necessary to determine the statutory maximum civil pen-
alty—the number of barrels and the appropriate multiplier.  All that was left
with respect to the United States’ filed claims was to determine the correct
penalty for BP and Anadarko within the statutory maximum.381  The Clean
Water Act sets forth eight factors for the court to consider in determining
the specific penalty to be imposed on any particular violator:
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 525.
379. Id.at 520.
380. Id.
381. In an interesting side note, the court was faced with an unusual legal question
related to the per barrel maximum amount.  Specifically, the Clean Water Act specifies a
penalty of $3,000 per barrel for gross negligence.  Congress passed the Federal Civil Penal-
ties Inflation Adjustment Act in 1990 to adjust civil penalties in many federal statutes for
inflation by requiring the head of agencies to adjust civil penalties imposed by statutes under
their jurisdiction for inflation at least every four years. Pub. L. 104–134, § 31001(s), 110 Stat.
1321 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note, § 4).  Both the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Coast Guard have enforcement authority under the Clean Water Act.  Paradoxically,
at the time of the Deepwater Horizon spill, EPA had adjusted its civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act to $4,300 per barrel, while the Coast Guard had adjusted its penalties to
$4,000. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2010) with 33 C.F.R. § 27.3 (2010).  BP argued that
neither adjustment had authority to inflate the civil penalty.  Rather, it argued that the
Department of Justice was the only agency with authority inflate the penalty. See In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179, 2015 WL 729701, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2015).  By contrast, the
United States argued that EPA’s penalty inflation applied because the Coast Guard had
made errors in its calculations. Id.  The court found that the United States’ interpretation
was the better one and therefore that the statutory maximum penalty for BP would be calcu-
lated using $4,300 per barrel. Id. at *3.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA103.txt unknown Seq: 60 19-MAY-17 12:50
124 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 6:1
• seriousness of the violation;
• economic benefit to the violator;
• degree of culpability involved;
• any other penalty for the same incident;
• any history of prior violations;
• the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the viola-
tor to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge;
• the economic impact of the penalty on the violator; and
• any other matters as justice may require.382
Almost every one of these eight factors raised interesting issues in the Deep-
water Horizon litigation.
a. The Seriousness of the Harm and Mitigation
of the Harm
The United States emphasized the first of the eight statutory factors –
the seriousness of the violation – by adducing evidence about human health
harms, economic losses, environmental harm, and even impacts on society at
large.383  BP countered that it had spent billions of dollars conducting a
large, comprehensive, and expensive response action that was in many (but
not all) respects successful.384  BP also highlighted how much it had paid to
various private party claims.385  Notably, these are two sides of the same
coin: only in a serious spill would enormous response efforts and large
claims payments be required.  So the question arose: does a large response
action merit reduction or increase in the penalty?
In a somewhat ironic twist, it was BP that demanded a public showing
of the harm it had caused.  The United States had argued that the spill was
so obviously “serious” that neither side should waste the court’s time prov-
ing (or disproving) that fact.386  BP, however, sought to prove that its re-
sponse efforts mitigated the harms at issue.387  Eventually, well over half of
the live witnesses called by the United States related to showing “serious-
382. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8) (2012).
383. See Clean Water Act – Penalty Phase: United States’ Post-Trial Brief, In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2015), Rec. Doc. 14341.
384. See Penalty Phase Post-Trial Brief of BP Exploration & Production Inc. at 1–2, In
re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2015), Rec. Doc. 14344.
385. See id.
386. One motive for this motion was to preclude discovery into the on-going, extra-
judicial natural resource damage assessment, the same concern discussed above. See supra
Part VII.
387. BP Exploration & Production Inc.’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion of
the United States to Limit Evidence about the “Seriousness” Factor at 2–8, In re Oil Spill,
No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2014), Rec. Doc. 12463.
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ness.”  Moreover, the United States agreed that BP had performed an ade-
quate response action—the first witness acknowledged that BP “did a pretty
good job”388—but that any response action has dangers and risks and that no
response action can completely eliminate the harm caused by the spill.389
When it ultimately ruled, the court found that the oil spill was “ex-
tremely serious,” “gravely serious,” and “a massive and severe tragedy.”390
On the other hand, the court considered BP’s expenditures on response and
compensation,391 and noted that “BP promptly paid the Coast Guard’s in-
voices.”392  More pointedly, the court stated that “had BPXP not settled
with the Government, the court would be inclined to find that BPXP’s miti-
gation efforts warrants a significant reduction of its penalty.”393  Because
BP settled, no one but Judge Barbier knows exactly how much he would
have reduced the penalty to account for BP’s “pretty good” response action.
b. Ability to Pay and Economic Benefit
The remainder of the proof related to BP in the third phase of trial
focused on BP’s argument that it had a limited ability to pay a civil penalty.
BP focused on both plummeting oil prices and the liability that BP had
already sustained from the oil spill to show that its American subsidiary—
the named defendant and lease-holder—had such limited assets that any
penalty over three billion dollars would exceed the entire value of the sub-
sidiary.394  The United States, however, demonstrated that the American
subsidiary could access funding from London to pay any penalty im-
posed.395  Through several witnesses, the United States offered evidence
that BP operated its subsidiaries as an integrated company and that the
American subsidiary had exactly as much money as the ultimate parent—BP
388. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 101:11–13. R
389. Id. at 23:1–25.
390. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 570 ¶ 42 (E.D. La. 2015).  By the time of this
ruling, BP had settled, so the opinion relates to the penalty for Anadarko.  Nevertheless,
certain findings relate equally to BP.
391. E.g., id. 572–73 ¶¶ 60–66, 574–75 ¶¶ 75–89.
392. Id. at 575 ¶ 86.
393. Id. at 528 n.111.
394. See, e.g., R. Bruce Den Uyl, Expert Rebuttal Report, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-
2179 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2014), Trial Exhibit 13161. In a procedural twist, BP announced
near the conclusion of the third trial that its selected economic expert had been diagnosed
with a brain tumor and could not come to trial to testify in person.  BP requested an exten-
sion of the trial to allow it to identify a new witness and prepare a new report.  The court
again focused on the fact that the trial was to the bench, not a jury, and that BP’s original
expert witness had prepared three reports and had been deposed.  Based on these facts, the
Court rejected BP’s request. Transcript of Trial, supra note 327, at 2323:08-2329:03. R
395. See, e.g., Clean Water Act – Penalty Phase United States’ Post-Trial Brief, supra
note 383, at 28–30.
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plc—wanted it to have.396  Ultimately, the court did not have to answer the
interesting questions raised by this testimony, including the court’s own
question as to whether it could order a penalty to be paid in installments
over time.397
The other financial penalty factor—the “economic benefit” of the viola-
tion—was not the subject of proof at the third phase of trial. Fifth Circuit
precedent required that the court make an estimate of the economic benefit
resulting from the violation.398  In ruling on Anadarko’s penalty, the court
did just that; relying on testimony from the first phase of trial, Judge
Barbier determined that the defendants accrued a benefit of approximately
$13.5 million.399  Contrary to the defendants’ arguments, however, the court
specifically held that “the fact that there is little or no economic benefit does
not mean that no penalty may be imposed, nor does it necessarily warrant a
reduced penalty.”400  Rather, the United States argued that the lack of eco-
nomic benefit shows just how flagrant the violations were—to save “little or
no” money, the defendants wreaked havoc on the Gulf region.401
c. Culpability
Virtually all of the trial time dedicated to Anadarko’s defenses was fo-
cused on its contention that it could not be considered culpable because the
court allocated it no fault during the first phase of trial.  Therefore,
Anadarko argued that it should not be ordered to pay more than a nominal
civil penalty.402  Anadarko had been successful in several pretrial motions
limiting evidence regarding its culpability and offered evidence during the
third phase of trial that it was essentially a mere “investor” who could not
and should not be subject to any penalty.403  Despite its success in the pre-
396. Id.
397. Transcript of Trial, supra note 46, at 62:24–63:22. R
398. United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 552–53 (5th Cir. 2013).
399. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 571 ¶ 50 (E.D. La. 2015).
400. Id. at 581.
401. “For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For
want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider the message was lost. For want of a
message the battle was lost. For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. And all for the want
of a horseshoe nail.” James Baldwin, Fifty Famous People, THE BALDWIN PROJECT, http://www
.mainlesson.com/display.php?author=baldwin&book=people&story=nails (last visited Dec.
27, 2016).  As the United States argued in its final post-trial brief, “the Court should recog-
nize that the entire disaster could have been prevented for a (proportionately) miniscule
amount of money.” See Clean Water Act – Penalty Phase United States’ Post-Trial Brief,
supra note 383, at 48.
402. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 576 ¶ 98.
403. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference, supra note 265, at 30–43. R
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trial rulings, at the trial, the judge noted that Anadarko’s argument was
inconsistent with the statutory scheme:
It sounds like, frankly, this witness and the next witness, the next
expert for Anadarko, seem to me to be making more of a policy
argument, policy arguments as to why a non-operator shouldn’t be
subjected to penalties under the Clean Water Act.  If that’s the
case, I think you’re in the wrong venue. Maybe you need to go to
Congress, because Congress has already decided that by enacting
the Clean Water Act, Section 311, which says that there is strict
liability if you are the owner or the operator of a facility from
which oil is discharged into navigable waters, regardless of whether
you’re legally culpable in the sense of negligence.404
The court confirmed its views in its findings of fact and conclusions of law
related to the civil penalty for Anadarko, imposing a civil penalty of $159.5
million on the alleged “non-operator.”405  That penalty is, by itself, the larg-
est Clean Water Act penalty judgment ever issued by a court after trial on
the merits.
X. GETTING TO THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CIVIL
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS
Though the pretrial and trial procedures would be sufficient to prove
the premise of this article—that the Manual for Complex Litigation and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are right to require active judicial involve-
ment and professional cooperation by counsel—the ultimate resolution of
many claims through various settlement processes go farther in proving
these points.
A. Early Restoration Agreements
One of the earliest partial settlements in the case was the agreement
reached between the United States, the five Gulf States, and BP to address
the ongoing damage the spill was doing to the natural resources found in
the spill’s path.  In 2011, the United States joined with the federal trustees
in negotiating an unprecedented “Framework Agreement,” through which
BP agreed to fund early restoration of natural resources — prior to the
completion of the injury assessment and prior to the final Restoration Plan
404. Transcript of Trial, supra note 327, at 2213:01–12. R
405. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 563.  This decision was issued after the Consent
Decree with BP was lodged, by which time, all other parties had settled.
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for the entire incident—in amounts up to $1 billion.406  In exchange for
funding the projects, BP would receive negotiated, stipulated offsets to be
applied against the ultimate assessment of injury and damages under the
Oil Pollution Act.407  The Trustees selected the projects under that Act’s
restoration selection procedures, which include publishing a draft Restora-
tion Plan, with an analysis of restoration alternatives (including “no ac-
tion”), and accepting public comment.408  By 2015, the Trustees had
publicly announced final Records of Decision to implement over sixty-five
projects, amounting to approximately $877 million of the $1 billion, and had
agreed with BP on the stipulated NRD Offsets for each of those projects.409
B. Private Parties Settlement
Another critical settlement that demonstrated the importance of active
judicial involvement was the two class action settlements with BP: one for
private parties’ economic damages (e.g., lost income)410 and a second for
medical benefits for plaintiffs injured or potentially harmed during the re-
sponse action.411  These settlements—negotiated by private parties, not by
the United States—were at least partially the result of two driving forces.
First, the court had set a firm and fast trial date, and not surprisingly, the
private settlement was completed just as the parties were making final prep-
arations for the first trial.412  Second, BP had the benefit of an interpleader-
type action (in this case, the Admiralty Limitation filed by Transocean),
which had the desirable effect of bringing plaintiffs to the table (due again
to a deadline set by the court).413  Because BP knew, roughly, the universe
of claimants, it was in a better position to make an informed decision about
settlement.
406. See Framework for Early Restoration Addressing Injuries Resulting from the Deep-
water Horizon Oil Spill at 1, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2011),
Rec. Doc. 2239-1.
407. Id. at 3.
408. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 990.23 (1996).
409. See e.g., Notice of Filing of Stipulations (Phase IV) Under the Framework for Early
Restoration Addressing Injuries Resulting from the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, In re Oil
Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Sept. 24, 2015), Rec. Doc. 15378 (detailing different
amounts of money attributed to each project).
410. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 803 (5th Cir. 2014); DEEPWATER HORI-
ZON CLAIMS CENTER, http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com (last visited Dec.
27, 2016).
411. See DEEPWATER HORIZON MEDICAL BENEFITS CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR, https://deepwater
horizonmedicalsettlement.com/en-us/home.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2016).
412. See Third Amended Pretrial Order No. 41, supra note 351. R
413. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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The settlement established a claims process overseen by Special Master
Patrick Juneau.414  The resolution of these claims achieved an important
goal of ensuring those individually and directly injured by the spill were
compensated as early as possible.  Such a result would have been impossible
without the active judicial attention and firm trial date.
C. Criminal Plea
Another settlement important to the resolution of the civil litigation
was actually achieved outside the multidistrict litigation: the resolution of
the criminal claims.  Common sense dictates that a party facing both crimi-
nal and civil liability will hesitate to resolve the civil liability before having
a sense of the criminal fines it may be facing.
But in this case, by December 2010, the Attorney General publicly an-
nounced that a criminal investigation into the causes and response to the oil
spill had been opened.415  The criminal prosecution was led by the Deepwa-
ter Horizon Task Force, including the Criminal Division and the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice, several
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and several federal investigatory agencies such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Environmental Protection
Agency.416
In November 2012, the Department of Justice announced the largest
criminal resolution in American history: four billion dollars.417  BP pled
guilty to felony manslaughter charges for the eleven people killed in the
explosion and fire, a felony charge for obstruction of Congress, and charges
under the Clean Water Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act.418  While the
414. The claims process ultimately spurred substantial collateral litigation over BP’s
complaint that it was paying more than expected under the settlement. See, e.g., In re Deep-
water Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2015).
415. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces
Civil Lawsuit Against Nine Defendants for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Dec. 15, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-eric-holder-announces-civil-lawsuit-
against-nine-defendants-deepwater.
416. On January 3, 2013 (on the eve of the Phase One trial in the civil action) the task
force announced criminal plea agreement with Transocean for $400 million. Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transocean Agrees to Plead Guilty to Environmental Crime and Enter
Civil Settlement to Resolve U.S. Clean Water Act Penalty Claims from Deepwater Horizon
Incident (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/transocean-agrees-plead-guilty-envi-
ronmental-crime-and-enter-civil-settlement-resolve-us.
417. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BP Exploration & Production Inc. Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress
Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
bp-exploration-and-production-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environmental.
418. Guilty Plea Agreement at 1 ¶ 1, United States v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 12-
292 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2012), Rec. Doc. 2.
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criminal sanction included a significant fine to punish the crimes, it also
included measures to repair the harm and change corporate behavior.  First,
the criminal resolution was specifically structured so that more than half of
the monies would directly benefit the Gulf of Mexico region.419  Approxi-
mately $2.394 billion dollars was dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserv-
ing, and conserving the marine and coastal environment, ecosystems, and
bird and wildlife habitat in the Gulf of Mexico and bordering states.420
Money would also be directed to barrier island restoration and river diver-
sion off the Louisiana coast to further improve the coastal wetlands affected
by the spill.421  Second, the plea agreement required that BP hire certain
subject matter experts to address BP’s conduct of behavior.422  BP had to
agree to retain a process safety and risk management monitor and an inde-
pendent auditor to oversee BP’s process safety, risk management and drill
equipment maintenance for its Gulf of Mexico operations.423  Additionally,
BP had to retain an ethics monitor to improve BP’s code of conduct to
ensure BP’s future candor with the U.S. government.424
D. Settlements with Other Parties
Other settlements were also key to bringing an ultimate resolution to
the United States’ and the States’ claims.  First, on February 17, 2012, the
United States announced it settled with MOEX for a $70 million civil pen-
alty and conservation projects in the Gulf of Mexico region that were esti-
mated to cost at least $20 million.425  At the time, this penalty was the
largest civil penalty under the Clean Water Act.426  Less than a year later,
Transocean agreed to plead guilty to criminal offenses and to settle its civil
liability, paying $1 billion in civil penalties and $400 million in criminal
fines.427  This settlement then became the largest civil penalty ever imposed
under the Clean Water Act.428  These settlements were important in an-
other way, as well, because they allowed the United States to focus on litiga-
419. Id. at Exhibit B, 18 ¶ 37(a).
420. Id. at Exhibit B, 16 § 35.
421. Id. at Exhibit B, 18 ¶ 37(b).
422. Id. at Exhibit B, 9 ¶ 11(a).
423. Id. at Exhibit B, 1–2 ¶ 1(a), 8 ¶¶ 9–13.
424. Id. at Exhibit B, 2 ¶ 11(b).  The civil Consent Decree reiterates that BP is in full
compliance with the criminal remedial order.
425. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Moex Offshore Agrees to $90 Million Partial




427. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 416. R
428. Id.
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tion against the two largest defendants, BP and Anadarko, and made clear
to BP the nature of any settlement that the United States would demand.
One other settlement helped pave the way for the settlement of the
civil environmental claims.  Specifically, Anadarko had asserted that BP was
grossly negligent in causing the well to explode.429  In an October 2011
settlement, Anadarko agreed to pay BP $4 billion to resolve claims against
each other arising out of the Deepwater Horizon incident.430  By resolving
the dispute with Anadarko, BP could estimate its total outstanding liabili-
ties, facilitating the ultimate settlements with the United States and the
States.
E. Debarment and Suspension
Another investigation was launched by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s Office of Suspension and Debarment.  This office is part of a
government-wide program to prevent fraud, abuse, and other misconduct in
government contracting.431  Pursuant to regulation, a company may be sus-
pended from contracting with the federal government for up to one year
upon a showing that a company has engaged in criminal conduct or other
misconduct.432  Pursuant to these same regulations, for certain criminal
convictions or civil judgments, a company can be “debarred”—excluded from
government contracting—for a longer time, as appropriate to the conduct at
issue.433
Before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP had often supplied the fed-
eral government with fuel through contracts.434  At the time of the debar-
ment and suspension investigation, BP held more than $1.34 billion in
federal contracts to supply fuel to various Department of Defense
agencies.435
429. See Press Release, BP Press Office, BP Announces Settlement with Anadarko Pe-
troleum Company of Claims Related to Deepwater Horizon Accident (Oct. 17, 2011), http://
www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/bp-announces-settlement-with-anadar
ko-petroleum-company-of-claims-related-to-deepwater-horizon-accident.html (“Anadarko
will no longer pursue its allegations of gross negligence with respect to BP.”).
430. Id.
431. See EPA, Suspension and Debarment Program, GRANTS, https://www.epa.gov/grants/
suspension-and-debarment-program (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
432. See 2 C.F.R. § 180.125 (2016).
433. See, e.g., id. § 180.865.
434. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8 ¶ 35, BP v. McCarthy,
No. 13-cv-2349 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2013), Rec. Doc. 1.
435. Id.
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EPA investigated BP and eventually issued a temporary suspension to
BP, in light of its history of environmental violations.436  BP sued EPA to
lift the suspension.437  By March 13, 2014, EPA and BP entered into an
Administrative Agreement resolving the suspension and debarment is-
sues.438  In addition to incorporating the requirements of the criminal plea
discussed below, “[t]he [a]dministrative agreement also requires actions re-
lated to maintenance or improvement of ethics and compliance programs
and good corporate governance activities, such as: code-of-conduct training,
the operation of an employee concerns hotline, and maintenance of risk-
based compliance standards and procedures for BP Entities based in the
United States.”439  The Administrative Agreement further contains specific
“provisions targeted to deep water drilling safety in the United States, in-
cluding provisions related to contractor oversight and audits of safety and
environmental management systems.”440  As discussed below, this Adminis-
trative Agreement was incorporated into the Consent Decree resolving the
United States’ claims against BP.
F. The Civil Settlement with BP
1. Setting the Table
As discussed in this article, by early 2015, a number of actions had
occurred.  BP had settled its liability with private plaintiffs, entered a crimi-
nal plea, participated in three different civil trials, and was awaiting the
judge’s verdict on a penalty.  In addition, BP was engaged in costly discov-
ery on the Gulf States’ claims for economic damages.441  BP was aware that
436. Letter from Richard Pelletier, Suspension and Debarment Official, EPA, to Robert
Dudley, CEO, BP plc, BP v. McCarthy, No. 13-cv-2349 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2012), Rec.
Doc. 1-5.
437. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 434, at ¶¶ R
79–92.
438. Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc., the United
States of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas at
App. 4, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2016), Rec. Doc. 16093 [herein-
after Consent Decree].
439. Id. at 33 ¶ X.34.c.
440. Id.
441. The court had begun pretrial preparation for the State of Alabama’s claims. On July
16, 2014, the court set a trial date of September 16, 2015. See Order Regarding Alabama
Damages Case, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. July 16, 2014), Rec. Doc. 13149.
The State of Louisiana objected to the selection of Alabama as the first of the economic
damages case and filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, arguing that Louisiana had
“consistently been denied the opportunity to prosecute any of its claims or to participate in
critical aspects of its case” because the District Court elected to try the State of Alabama’s
economic claims before the State of Louisiana’s claims.  Louisiana complained that the court
had disregarded “repeated requests from Louisiana that its economic loss trial proceed” and
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once the States’ claims were resolved, it still faced significant discovery and,
ultimately, trial on natural resource damages.
Outside of court, the Trustee Council was in place, and BP had been
paying hundreds of millions of dollars in “early” restoration projects.  BP
and the Trustees faced years of future natural resource damage assessment
work (and associated costs) to be followed by either a settlement or the
litigation of the largest natural resource damages case in history.
By April 30, 2015, both sides had rested and briefed all issues regarding
the application of the penalty factors.  Regardless of whether the maximum
available penalty remained at $13.7 billion or reverted to $3.5 billion, the
court was not likely to award the maximum penalty, after considering the
eight factors set out at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8).  Indeed, the United States
had expressly conceded that the court should not award the maximum pen-
alty, while BP vigorously argued that the penalty should be substantially
lower than the maximum.442  The United States faced a realistic predicted
litigation outcome less than the maximum penalty.  On June 10, 2015, the
court issued an order indicating that the ruling on Phase Three was
imminent.443
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice was preparing for the natural
resources damage litigation.  The Assistant Attorney General for the Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources Division, John Cruden, led a meeting with
the Trustee Council and explained to the trustees the extent of the litigation
to date and the nature of the case that BP put on in the penalty trial which
addressed, in part, environmental harm issues relevant to the planned natu-
ral resource damages trial.  Thus, by June 2015, all of the parties—state,
federal and BP—were facing more years of litigation, costly discovery, and
delay in implementing the final remedy for the harm that the oil spill had
caused and was causing.
“the fact that the State of Alabama had previously stated it would prefer its trial take place in
its home state.” See Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 20–21, In re Oil Spill, No. 13-31317
(5th Cir. Dec. 31, 2013), Rec. No. 00512485381.  The Fifth Circuit denied the request with-
out an opinion. See Order, In re Oil Spill, No. 13-31317 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2014), Rec. Doc.
00512498419.
442. Compare Clean Water Act – Penalty Phase United States’ Post-Trial Brief, supra
note 383, at 1 (seeking a civil penalty “that approaches the statutory maximum”), with Pen-
alty Phase Post-Trial Brief of BP Exploration & Production Inc., supra note 384, at 1 (seek-
ing a civil penalty “at the low end of the statutory range”).
443. See Order Canceling 6/18/15 Status Conference, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Jun. 10, 2015), Rec. Doc. 14705.
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2. Reaching an Agreement in Principle
Demonstrating the importance of judicial involvement, the Court had
appointed the former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis
Freeh, as a Special Master to review the class action settlement in 2013.444
In April 2015, Special Master Louis Freeh began facilitating settlement dis-
cussions between the Assistant Attorney General Cruden and the Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of BP plc.  Though much of the
specific discussion is still governed by a confidentiality order that was en-
tered to allow expedited settlement discussions,445 a general outline of the
ensuing negotiations shows the importance of the two themes that served so
well in the litigation: judicial involvement and professional cooperation.
After several different meetings, when the parties realized that settle-
ment was a real possibility, settlement discussions started in earnest under
the supervision of Magistrate Shushan, Special Master Freeh, and Special
Master Juneau.  The parties met from May to September in either New
Orleans or Washington, D.C.  The New Orleans meetings included senior
representatives from the five Gulf States as well as the small federal negoti-
ating team. Judge Shushan entered a series of confidentiality orders that
restricted access and limited participants to a few.446
Ultimately, the parties focused on obtaining BP’s binding financial
commitment and involvement in future work to address the harm caused by
the spill.  Key issues in settlement discussions were the ultimate penalty,
natural resource damages, the possibility of unknown conditions arising, in-
junctive relief, BP’s future responsibility at the site, and payment of past
government expenses.  In addition, BP was also beginning negotiations with
individual states and government entities concerning their economic
claims.447
On July 2, 2015, the parties announced that they had reached an agree-
ment in principle.448  To protect the spirit of the settlement and minimize
interference with the negotiation of the full settlement, Judge Shushan
444. See Order, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jul. 2, 2013), Rec. Doc.
10564.
445. Order Regarding Modification of Earlier Confidentiality Orders, In re Oil Spill,
No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015), Rec. Doc. 15434.
446. The description of the settlement discussions is based on the personal knowledge
and observations of the authors.
447. The description of the settlement discussions is based on the personal knowledge
and observations of the authors.
448. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Loretta E.
Lynch on the Agreement in Principle with BP to Settle Civil Claims for the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill (July 2, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-
loretta-e-lynch-agreement-principle-bp-settle-civil-claims.
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worked with the parties to identify and limit by order exactly what informa-
tion would be released about the agreement.449  That information was con-
veyed to the press and to Congress.  Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
stated the following:
Today, I am pleased to say that after productive discussions with
BP over the previous several weeks, we have reached an agreement
in principle that would justly and comprehensively address out-
standing federal and state claims, including Clean Water Act civil
penalties and natural resource damages.  BP is also resolving signif-
icant economic claims with the impacted state and local govern-
ments.  We will work diligently during the next several months to
incorporate the agreement in principle into a consent decree, which
would then undergo public comment before court approval.  If ap-
proved by the court, this settlement would be the largest settlement
with a single entity in American history; it would help repair the
damage done to the Gulf economy, fisheries, wetlands and wildlife;
and it would bring lasting benefits to the Gulf region for genera-
tions to come.450
3. Negotiating the Consent Decree
The agreement in principle was a major step forward, but it was non-
binding.  Four major tasks had to be completed before the settlement could
become final: (1) BP, the United States, and the Gulf States had to agree to
the complete terms of a consent decree; (2) the Trustees had to complete
the damage assessment and restoration plan; (3) the Trustees had to comply
with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act by creating
an Environmental Impact Statement to analyze the environmental impact of
the planned action;451  and (4) BP had to settle as many of the economic
claims of city, county or other local entities as possible.
The only way of completing these tasks was to divide and conquer.
The Trustees, both state and federal, focused on completing their detailed
assessment of the damages, restoration plan, and environmental impact
study.  The United States, led by Assistant Attorney General Cruden, and
BP took the lead on negotiating the consent decree embodying the settle-
ment of the penalty and natural resource damages claims.  The States,
449. Confidentiality Order, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Jul. 2, 2015),
Rec. Doc. 14801.
450. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 448. R
451. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2012).
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Judge Freeh, and Judge Shushan focused on drafting a consent decree
resolving the States’ economic damages claims.
Over the next few months, the parties worked together to convert the
general statements in the agreements in principle into a full consent decree.
In the end, the parties acted with breakneck speed, spurred on Judge Shu-
shan and the Special Masters.  These individuals set tight schedules, de-
cided who would meet with whom and when, and provided logistical
solutions to problems that arose.  This judicial supervision was critical to
resolving claims of six sovereigns related to the largest oil spill in American
history.
Critical, too, was the tone set by the court and followed by counsel.
Having committed to settlement, counsel worked over weekends, late at
night, and agreed to disagree on things that were not critical to the settle-
ment.  Without this professional cooperation, which allowed for zealous
protection of each client’s interests but set aside petty bickering, gamesman-
ship, and tactical posturing, a settlement could not have been achieved in
the six months between the onset of negotiations and lodging of the Con-
sent Decree.
4. Finalizing the Consent Decree
The final consent decree negotiations were conducted over several days
in New Orleans.  In a tightly scheduled set of meetings, the parties ad-
dressed the difficult remaining issues and set aside their differences to reach
the landmark settlement.  To ensure that the settlement was truly accept-
able to all parties, Judge Shushan directed each state to obtain the signature
of both its Attorney General and its Governor.452  Because much work re-
mained to be done on the natural resource damages assessment before the
settlement could be made public, Judge Shushan collected the parties’ signa-
tures and held them essentially in escrow until all parties were ready to
lodge the Consent Decree.
On October 5, 2015, the United States lodged the Consent Decree with
the court.453  Lodging is the formal act of submitting the proposed settle-
ment to the court while giving the public an opportunity to review the
settlement and provide comments, suggestions, or objections to the settle-
ment.  The settlement was announced by the United States in a press con-
ference at which the Attorney General was accompanied by the Secretary of
Commerce, Secretary of Agriculture, Administrator of the Environmental
452. Judge Shushan issued this oral order in the presence of the authors at the final
settlement meeting in New Orleans.
453. Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean Water Act and
Oil Pollution Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,180 (Oct. 5, 2015).
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Protection Agency, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, and the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment
and Natural Resources Division.454  The Department of Justice simultane-
ously also notified each of the Congressional representatives for the Gulf
States about the settlement and answered any questions the representatives
had regarding the settlement.455
On the same day that the United States lodged the Consent Decree, the
Trustees published the final damage assessment, restoration plan, and envi-
ronmental impact statement.456  This publication was accompanied by the
opening of an online library of the documents the Trustees considered in
choosing the restoration activities for the affected area.457
5. The Public Comment Process
Consistent with Department of Justice policy,458 the United States and
the Gulf States’ agreement to the Consent Decree was conditioned on a 60-
day comment period and an opportunity for the sovereigns to determine
whether the comments received during the public comment procedure “dis-
close facts or considerations which indicate that the proposed judgment is
inappropriate, improper, or inadequate.”459  At the same time, under the
natural resource damage regulations, the Trustees were required to hold a
45-day comment period regarding the draft damage assessment and restora-
tion plan.460  For ease of administration, the Trustees extended the com-
ment period so that it would end on the same day as the public comment
period on the Consent Decree.461
454. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6. R
455. Id.
456. Notice of Availability of a Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill; Draft Programmatic Dam-
age Assessment and Restoration Plan (PDARP) and Draft Programmatic Environmental Im-
pact Statement (PEIS), 80 Fed. Reg. 60,126 (Oct. 5, 2015).
457. NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150.  The Plan was finalized after an agreement in R
principle with BP was announced.
458. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2002).
459. Id. § 50.7(b); Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean
Water Act and Oil Pollution Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,180, 60,181 (Oct. 5, 2015).
460. 15 C.F.R. § 990.23(c)(2)(ii)(C) (2016).
461. Notice of Availability of a Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill; Draft Programmatic Dam-
age Assessment and Restoration Plan (PDARP) and Draft Programmatic Environmental Im-
pact Statement (PEIS), 80 Fed. Reg. 60,126, 60,126 (Oct. 5, 2015) (providing that the
Trustees would accept comments through December 4, 2015). Though Department of Justice
policy only requires a thirty-day comment opportunity, the United States opted to provide
twice that long for comments on the Consent Decree because of the expected public interest
in the settlement.
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Both the Department of Justice and the Trustees accepted public com-
ments submitted by email, U.S. mail, or through an internet portal.462  Ad-
ditionally, the Trustees and the United States provided eight separate
public meetings spread throughout each of the Gulf States and Washington,
D.C.463  In all, the United States received comments on the Consent De-
cree from over 34,000 commenters.464  More than 99% of the comments
were form letters on a single issue: concern about the issue of tax deduct-
ibility of payments due under the Decree.465  Additionally, 96 commenters
discussed their own personal descriptions of injury or private claims result-
ing from the spill, including physical injury or economic losses, 30 com-
menters expressed concern that the amounts in the settlement were not
enough, 10 expressed their belief that the civil penalty was too low, 20
raised questions about criminal fines, and 35 asked for an extension to the
comment period.466  Approximately 20 other commenters thanked the De-
partment for its work and expressed support for the Decree.467  Finally,
roughly 25 distinct, in-depth comments were received from a number of
non-profit environmental groups, and other community groups.468  While
these groups supported the Decree restoration plan, they raised specific
concerns, chiefly related to how the Trustee agencies would administer res-
toration going forward.  The Department of Justice prepared a “Response to
Comments” related to the Decree, addressing the comments expressly di-
rected to the Department.469
The Trustees received approximately 6,370 submissions and provided a
formal response to those comments in the final damage assessment and res-
toration plan.470  Many of the comments to the Trustees related to “Gov-
ernance” of the Trustees in the future, including costs of administration,
organization of the agencies, and future options for public input, but few
462. Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean Water Act and
Oil Pollution Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,180, 60,181 (Oct. 5, 2015); Notice of Availability of a
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill; Draft Programmatic Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan
(PDARP) and Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), 80 Fed. Reg.
60,126, 60,127 (Oct. 5, 2015).
463. Memorandum in Support of Unopposed Motion by the United States for Entry of
Consent Decree with BP at 2, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016),
Rec. Doc. 16022-1.
464. Id. at 5–6.




469. Response to Comments on the Consent Decree, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179
(E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016), Rec. Doc. 16022-5.
470. All of the comments can be viewed and searched on the Trustees’ website, labeled
“Online Comments Received.” NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA103.txt unknown Seq: 75 19-MAY-17 12:50
Fall 2016] The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Litigation 139
expressed concern about the total amount of damages or the use of the
ecosystem approach.471
After reviewing the public comments, the United States and each of the
Gulf States concluded that they continued to believe that the settlement
was sound and in the public interest.  Accordingly, on March 22, 2016, the
United States moved for approval of the Consent Decree,472 and on April 4,
2016, Judge Barbier signed the Consent Decree and entered it in docket.473
XI. THE CONSENT DECREE TERMS
While no settlement could undo all of the harm to lives, families, com-
munities, and the environment caused by the spill, the Consent Decree with
BP is nonetheless unprecedented.  Combined with the separate-but-simul-
taneous settlement of the Gulf States’ economic damages claims, the overall
settlement requires BP to pay over $20 billion,474 which is the largest settle-
ment with a single entity in the history of federal law enforcement.475
Following the court’s approval of the settlement, the payments set out
below are due over a 15-year period.476  However, the payment schedule can
be accelerated in case of corporate takeover or insolvency, and that is guar-
anteed by both the North American and UK parents of BPXP and other
mechanisms to ensure compliance by BP.477
First, BP must pay a $5.5 billion civil penalty, plus interest, to resolve
the claim of the United States under the Clean Water Act.478  That amount
will be distributed by operation of the RESTORE Act,479 so $4.4 billion
(80%) will be allocated to projects in the Gulf Coast region.
Second, to resolve the claim of the United States for injunctive relief
under the Clean Water Act, BP must publicly report on its mandatory ef-
forts to improve its drilling safety practices and other elements of its opera-
tions.480  Many of these reporting requirements are incorporated from
either the suspension and debarment settlement with the Environmental
Protection Agency or the criminal plea agreement that BP entered.481
471. See Memorandum in Support, supra note 463, at 22–31. R
472. Id. at 26.
473. Consent Decree, supra note 438, at 3. R
474. Joint Motion for Dismissal, In re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5,
2015), Rec. Doc. 15435.  The two settlements are related because they were negotiated simul-
taneously and conditioned upon each other. Id. at 9, 51.
475. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6. R
476. E.g., Consent Decree, supra note 438, at 19–20. R
477. Id. at 29–30 ¶ 29–31, Appendices 8–9.
478. Id. at 18 ¶ 10.
479. Id. at 18–19.
480. Id. at 34 ¶ 38.
481. Id. at 34–35.
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Third, BP must also pay up to $8.8 billion for natural resource damages
under the Oil Pollution Act,482 which includes $7.1 billion in payments over
15 years; $1 billion that BP pledged under a prior agreement; and up to
$700 million for unknown conditions and adaptive management.483  This
money will be spent to restore natural resources injured or lost as a result of
the spill.484  Significantly, the Decree allocates these moneys by location
and type.485  First, the restoration plan is divided into seven geographic
restoration “Areas” across the five Gulf States and also into “Region-wide”
and “Open Ocean” areas.486  Next, within these geographic areas, funds are
sub-allocated to Restoration “Types” (such as fish, birds, and shoreline) that
further the Restoration “Goals” of the Trustees (these are the rows).487
Thus, the CD adopts the outcome of the NRD Trustees’ Damage Assess-
ment and Restoration Plan.
Fourth, BP must pay $600 million more for various claims: $350 mil-
lion for state and federal assessment costs under the Oil Pollution Act;
$167.4 million for removal and other costs paid by the Coast Guard-admin-
istered Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund; and $82.6 million under the False
Claims Act, which includes the amount that will be paid for royalties on the
oil that was wasted.488
Finally, BP must pay up to $4.9 billion to State and Local Governmen-
tal Entities for their damages under OPA (such as lost taxes).489
XII. THE DAMAGES ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION PLAN
Although not required by the consent decree, all state and federal trust-
ees uniformly believed that the natural resource Damage Assessment and
Restoration Plan should be completed simultaneously with a completed
consent decree.  Although BP will play no role in creating or implementing
the restoration plan, the plan provides the necessary detail as to how the
damages recovered through the settlement will be spent, and provides trans-
parency to the public, guidance to decision makers, and a beginning to the
restoration process.
482. Id. at 20–22 ¶¶ 15–18.
483. Id. at 23 ¶ 21.
484. Id. at 22 ¶ 19.
485. See id. at App. 2 tbl.1.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 24–27 ¶¶ 22, 24.
489. Settlement Agreement Between the Gulf States and the BP Entities with Respect
to Economic and Other Claims Arising from the Deepwater Horizon Incident at 6 ¶ 3.1, In
re Oil Spill, No. 10-MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015), Rec. Doc. 15435-2.
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The injuries were staggering.  The outcome of the injury assessment
was set out as in the Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan.  The crea-
tures that lived in the water column that received over three million barrels
of oil and all of the dispersants were significantly impacted: 2–5 trillion
larval fish and 37–68 trillion invertebrates were killed.490  Up to 23% of
Sargassum in the Northern Gulf of Mexico – a sea grass that provides im-
portant habitat for breeding and other life cycles – was lost.491  Around BP’s
wellhead, over 770 square miles of habitat were damaged, and over four
square miles of reefs on the continental shelf edge were injured.492  Nearer
to shore, the Trustees estimate that between 4 and 8.3 billion subtidal oys-
ters died or were never born as a result of the spill.493
The spill also damaged wetlands along the coast: hundreds of miles of
above ground biomass died off, amphipods, periwinkles, and shrimp lost
cover habitat, and flounder and red drum did not grow as large as they
otherwise would have.494  In addition, 51,600—84,500 individual birds were
killed.495  The Trustees estimated that between 4,900 and 7,600 large juve-
nile and adult sea turtles and between 55,000 and as many as 160,000 small
juvenile sea turtles were killed by exposure to DWH oil.496  Bottlenose dol-
phins in Bay Barataria suffered 35% excess mortality, 46% excess failed
pregnancies, and 37% higher likelihood that animals would have adverse
health effects.497  Finally, the public lost approximately $700 million worth
of recreational opportunities (e.g., fishing).498  The Trustees concluded:
The injuries caused by the DWH incident affected such a broad
array of linked resources and services over such a large area that
they cannot be adequately described at the level of a single species,
a single habitat type, a single set of services, or even a single re-
gion.  Rather, the effects of the DWH incident constitute an
ecosystem-level injury.499
490. NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 4.4. R
491. Id. § 4.4.5; see also § 4.4.5.3.
492. Id. § 4.5.
493. Id. § 4.6.4.
494. Id. § 4.6.
495. Id. § 4.7.5.
496. Id. § 4.8.5.
497. Id. § 4.9.5.
498. Id. § 4.10.6.
499. Id. § 4.11.4.
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Faced with such a large ecosystem-level injury, the Trustees also de-
cided to focus the restoration on an ecosystem- or habitat-based ap-
proach.500  They decided to
employ an ecosystem approach toward implementing the integrated
restoration portfolio with the intent of enhancing the connectivity and
productivity of habitats and resources . . . .  [T]he key role of coastal
habitats in the interconnected Gulf of Mexico ecosystem helps en-
sure that multiple resources will benefit from restoration and that rea-
sonably inferred but unquantified injuries are likely to be addressed
. . . .  [E]mphasizing coastal habitat restoration . . . maximizes the
likelihood of providing long-term benefits to all resources.501
The Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan also allocated the money
across a set of goals that match up closely with the Goals set forth by the
Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (and Council):
• Restore and Conserve Habitat;
• Restore Water Quality;
• Replenish and protect living marine and coastal resources; and
• Provide and Enhance Recreational Opportunities.502
These goals were overlaid with a goal of Monitoring, Adaptive Manage-
ment, and Administrative Oversight to Support Restoration
Implementation.503
One other important aspect of the Damage Assessment and Restoration
Plan is the environmental impact statement prepared under the require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act.504  As contemplated under
the natural resource damage assessment regulations, the Trustees integrated
their environmental impact assessment with their overall planning.505  Thus,
the Trustees were required to consider other alternatives, including “no
500. Id. § 8.3.
501. Id. § 5.9.2 (emphasis added).
502. Compare GULF COAST ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION TASK FORCE, supra note 148, at 1, with R
NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 1.5.3.  Note that the Task Force included a goal of R
enhancing community resilience, whereas the Trustees did not, replacing that general goal
with the more specific reference to Recreational Opportunities.  The differing goals can be
explained by the differing governing laws.  OPA’s NRD provisions arguably require that the
Trustees’ DARP must restore the Natural Resources injured by the spill, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(A) and 2706(c) and (f), while the RESTORE Act’s requirements for spending
the civil penalty amounts are broader, including coastal flood protections and conservation
management. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(B) (2012).
503. See generally NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 5.1. R
504. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370m-12 (2012).
505. 15 C.F.R. § 990.23 (2016).
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human intervention.”506  Here, the Trustees also considered two vastly dif-
ferent programmatic approaches: (1) declining to select a programmatic res-
toration approach until further study was undertaken; and (2) directing the
majority of the funds to specific species (such as oysters, dolphins, or birds)
rather than to habitat and water quality improvements.507
XIII. ANTICIPATED OUTCOMES FROM THE SETTLEMENTS
The settlements are expected to have significant compensatory impacts
and yield and great benefits resulting from the federal enforcement efforts,
in several categories: improvements in drilling safety and spill response as a
result of penalties; injunctions; an influx of funding for research into drill-
ing safety and spill response an environmental sciences; compensation for of
the economic losses in the Gulf and improvements to the local economies;
and direct restoration of the ecosystem.
A. Penalties, Fines, and Injunctions
Clean Water Act civil penalties are intended to punish the violator and
to provide both general and specific deterrence.508  The $5.5 billion figure is
a reasonable settlement that sufficiently punishes BP and sends a clear de-
terrent message to the entire industry.
As for injunctions, the United States, prior to the ultimate civil settle-
ment, had already implemented two robust measures to improve both BP’s
drilling practices and ethics.  BP’s criminal plea agreement requires a safety
monitor and an ethics monitor, safety and environmental audits, and strict
drilling-specific requirements such as blowout preventer requirements and a
real-time operations monitoring center.509  As the judge who entered BP’s
guilty plea and sentence, Judge Vance, stated, the purpose was to make sure
that BP could not “return to business as usual while on probation.”510  Sepa-
rately, further monitoring and reporting requirements were imposed when
BP entered into an administrative agreement with EPA to resolve potential
suspension and debarment claims relating to the Macondo well spill and
other prior BP conduct.511
506. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b)(2).
507. NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, §1.5.4. R
508. In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 576 (E.D. La. 2015); Tull v. United States, 481
U.S. 412, 422–23 (1987).
509. See Judgment at 1–7 ¶¶ 1–4, United States v. BP Expl. & Prod., No. 12-cr-292
(E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013), Rec. Doc. 66-3 [hereinafter BP Judgement]; Consent Decree at
App. 6, supra note 438. R
510. Reasons for Accepting Plea Agreement at 18, United States v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
No. 12-cr-292 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2013), Rec. Doc. 65.
511. Consent Decree, supra note 438, at App. 4. R
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Under the Civil Decree, BP acknowledges compliance with the require-
ments of the prior two agreements, as well as their continuing force, and
must also post on a publicly-available web site information about the com-
pany’s ongoing performance under those agreements.512  These postings
should allow the public greater insight into BP’s performance under these
agreements.
Finally, the criminal fine of $1.25 billion was the largest criminal fine in
history, especially when the additional injunctive relief and restitution are
taken into account.513
Taken together, the fines, penalties, and injunctive requirements pro-
vide powerful incentives for BP to closely monitor its operations in the
future to ensure process safety to project workers and the environment.
Moreover, the deterrent impact of those measures are likely to motivate the
entire exploration and production industry to take great care in future
operations.
B. Science
The civil and criminal settlements also offer funding that must be used
for specified research purpose.
On May 24, 2010, BP announced a commitment to fund the newly-
created Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative, for ten years at a commitment
of $500 million.514  This initiative funds research aimed at investigating the
impacts of the spill on the ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico and improving
spill mitigation and remediation.515  BP voluntarily set up the Initiative, but
it later became a term of the criminal plea agreement that BP would con-
tinue to fund GOMRI.516
Another term of the plea agreement required BP to pay $350 million to
the National Academy of Sciences to fund research into oil spill prevention
and response in the Gulf of Mexico.517  The National Academy has set up a
512. Id. at 32–37 ¶¶ 34–39, App. 4.
513. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 417.
514. Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative, GoMRI History, ABOUT, http://gulfresearchinitia
tive.org/about-gomri/gri-history/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
515. Id.
516. Guilty Plea Agreement, supra note 418, at Exhibit B, at 16. R
517. Id.  Transocean paid an additional $150 million under its criminal plea. Judgment at
5, United States v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., No. 13-cr-1 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2013), Rec.
Doc. 31 [hereinafter Transocean Judgment] (mandating that Transocean pay an additional
$150 million under its criminal plea).
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thirty-year “Gulf Research Program,” whose plan is to fund research and
development, education and training, and environmental monitoring.518
Finally, the civil settlements will provide funding under the RE-
STORE Act, which designates 2.5% of the civil penalties to the Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring and Technology
Program within the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration.519  An additional 2.5% of the civil penalties is
allocated to Centers of Excellence Research grants, which will each focus on
science, technology, and monitoring related to Gulf restoration.520
C. Restoration of the Gulf Economies
As laid out above, the RESTORE Act provides funding to the Gulf
States (through a formula), some of which may be used for workforce devel-
opment, job creation, and infrastructure projects benefiting the economy or
to “improve” the economy of the Gulf Coast Region.521
Those state expenditures will supplement the financial compensation
that is provided to individuals and businesses under class action settlement.
D. Restoration of the Environment
The amount of damages recovered for natural resource injuries in this
settlement is unprecedented; so is the Trustee Councils’ plan for restoring
the Gulf’s ecosystem.522  Moreover, the duly-appointed Trustees, acting as a
coordinated state-federal Council, after years of scientific work, stated:
The Trustees believe that both the settlement and the program-
matic plan are appropriate . . . [and] will make the public whole for
the loss in natural resources and services suffered . . . . [T]he settle-
ment provides a reasonable approach to achieving the goals of OPA
to make the public and the environment whole, is a fair and reason-
able result, and advances the public interest.523
518. Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Engineering, Medicine, About the Gulf Research Program, ABOUT,
http://nationalacademies.org/gulf/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
519. RESTORE Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 1604(h), 126 Stat. 405, 605 (Jul. 6, 2012)
(partially codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t) & note).
520. Id. § 1605; Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council, supra note 161. R
521. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
522. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.25 (authorizing settlements where “the settlement is adequate
in the judgment of the trustees to satisfy the goal of OPA and is fair, reasonable, and in the
public interest, with particular consideration of the adequacy of the settlement to restore,
replace, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of the injured natural resources and services”).
523. NOAA ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, § 1.6. R
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The settlement even provides an allocation (up to $700 million) for
addressing unknown conditions and for adaptive management to be used 10
to 15 years after the settlement.524  “Major pollution sites can be complex to
study, and ecological conditions can change over time, with new informa-
tion revealing unknown conditions.”525  Often, large natural resource dam-
ages settlements will include a “re-opener” whereby the plaintiffs can re-
open a settled case if unknown conditions come to light and can seek to
prove the new conditions and additional damages.
In this case, the parties elected for a specific amount to be paid for
unknown conditions rather than a re-opener.  The approach in the Consent
Decree to dealing with unknown injuries has advantages relative to settle-
ments in which the parties provide for re-opening the settlement in the
event unknown conditions arise.  With a fixed payment, BP is obligated to
pay the agreed amounts without the need for the governments to prove the
existence of a spill-related injury unknown at settlement or any other re-
quirement that might apply before the re-opener can be used.  Additionally,
BP must pay the amount even if there are no new, unanticipated injuries to
natural resources.  Proving damages beyond what will be covered by this
settlement in such a massive, complex ecosystem – the Gulf of Mexico –
would present a more problematic litigation challenge than one might nor-
mally face when employing a re-opener in less complex circumstances.  The
likely outcome – given the ecosystem-wide restoration that will be imple-
mented with the stream of NRD payments – is that $700 million will ex-
ceed any amount of NRD for “unknown conditions” that the Trustees could
prove “result from” this incident in litigation 10 or 15 years from now.
Alongside the Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan, two other ma-
jor sources of funding for ecological restoration arise from the settlements
of this case.
First, under the criminal pleas with BP and Transocean  and the judg-
ment against Anadarko, over $2.5 billion is directed as funding to the “Gulf
Environmental Benefit Fund,” a newly created fund of the National Fish
and Wildlife Foundation.526  Of that total, $1.272 billion will be used for
524. Memorandum in Support, supra note 463, at 16–17. R
525. Id. at 16.  While some statutes require a re-opener, the Oil Pollution Act contains
no such requirements. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A), with 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762.
Nonetheless, a re-opener is an appropriate matter for consideration in any major natural
resource damages settlement. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Pro-
ceeding re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1037–38 (D. Mass. 1989).
526. See BP Judgment, supra note 509, at Attachment 1 (“The terms of the order include R
the payment of . . . $2.394 billion to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation . . . .”);
Transocean Judgment, supra note 517, at 5 (“In addition to the $100 million fine paid to the R
United States Treasury, a non-fine monetary penalty payment of $300 million is or-
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barrier island and river diversion projects in Louisiana, while $356 million
goes for natural resource projects in each of the following states: Alabama,
Florida, and Mississippi.  The final $203 million is for similar projects in
Texas.527
Second, as discussed above, the RESTORE Act provides funding for
ecological restoration.  Specifically, the total civil penalties are $6.6595 bil-
lion,528 of which $5.3276 billion (80% of the total) goes through the RE-
STORE Act formula.  $1.59828 billion (30% of the 80% of the total) is
entirely directed towards ecosystem restoration.529  65% ($3.46294 billion)
is allocated to the States, and such sums may be – but are not required to
be—spent on activities to improve the natural resources ecosystems of the
Gulf.530
It can thus be anticipated that the future restoration projects, taken
along with “early” restoration that has already been underway, will make the
public whole for the losses to their natural resources caused by the incident.
XIV. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: LESSONS FOR FUTURE CIVIL
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
The litigation arising out of the Deepwater Horizon disaster certainly
expanded the substantive law of environmental enforcement in a way that
will assist and inform future litigation.  For instance, the ruling on the first
phase of trial provided an unprecedented understanding of the legal stan-
dard for gross negligence under the Clean Water Act.
Similarly, the professional work of the Trustees in this case provided
exceptional insight into how to balance individual state interests when ad-
dressing wide areas of environmental impact.  The model set by this Trus-
tee Council, which was made up of very senior and knowledgeable
representatives, showed that creativity, persistence, and commitment can
make cooperative federalism successful.  While the path is never easy, the
dered . . . . $150 million shall be paid to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, a
nonprofit organization.”); Final Judgment as to Anadarko Entities, In re Oil Spill, No 10-
MDL-2179 (E.D. La. Dec. 16, 2015), Doc. 15659; Nat’l Fish & Wildlife Found., Gulf Envi-
ronmental Benefit Fund, http://www.nfwf.org/gulf/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Dec. 27,
2016).
527. Nat’l Fish & Wildlife Found., Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund, http://www.nfwf
.org/gulf/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
528. That is $5.5 billion from BP, $1.0 billion from Transocean, and $159.5 billion from
Anadarko.
529. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(2)(A) (2012).
530. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(B) (2012) (per capita component may be spent on natu-
ral resource restoration); id. § 1321(t)(3)(B)(i) (pro rata component may be spent on projects
to improve the ecosystems).
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Deepwater Horizon settlement shows that, with the right commitment, the
needs of all affected communities can be addressed.
More broadly, however, this case is proof of the wisdom of two essen-
tial concepts embodied in the Manual for Complex and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.  First, active judicial management throughout the litiga-
tion is essential.  From the court’s innovative use of pleading bundles,
through the dedicated oversight of the special masters and U.S. Magistrate
Judge, this litigation demonstrates what can be accomplished with the ap-
propriate level of judicial involvement.
Doubters may argue that it is not possible for courts to dedicate a
highly skilled Magistrate Judge and four special masters to every case.
Their point is well taken.  The Deepwater Horizon litigation, however, con-
tains numerous examples of judicial involvement that do not require the
extraordinary commitment necessary for a multi-district litigation that
could still expedite and improve resolution of all civil environmental en-
forcement – perhaps even all civil litigation.  Many of these examples are
described above, but some of the most prominent examples of simple steps
that courts could use to expedite civil litigation include: (1) using early pre-
trial conferences, or even the Rule 16 conference, to set clear expectations
regarding professional cooperation of counsel; (2) requiring the parties to
not just discuss but resolve procedural issues such as the format of produc-
tion, the preservation of information, scheduling and conduct of deposi-
tions, and exchange of exhibits before trial; (3) providing regularly
scheduled status conferences (probably less frequently than occurred in the
Deepwater Horizon litigation), at which the court can provide guidance on
emerging discovery issues before they become full-blown disputes; and (4)
strictly controlling motions practice with clear page limits, limits on extra-
neous briefing (such as sur-rebuttal briefs), and prompt rulings – even from
the bench where appropriate.
As to the second theme, professional cooperation of counsel, it is hard
to imagine a case more sensitive for both the plaintiffs and defendants.
People’s lives and livelihoods were significantly affected by the litigation
itself and the events giving rise to the litigation.  Yet, under the court’s
strong encouragement, all counsel took seriously their obligation to contrib-
ute to the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of all of the claims.  Par-
ties with vastly different views of the events and fault in the litigation could
still agree on procedural issues – from when and how to produce documents
to who went first in questioning witnesses.  Doubters may argue that it is
improbable to expect all efforts to cooperatively resolve all such issues.
They are no doubt correct.  But in the Deepwater Horizon litigation, as it
should be in all civil environmental enforcement, the parties always met and
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conferred on disputes, and if an agreement could not be reached, at least the
dispute could be narrowed and clarified for the court.
In short, the procedures adopted by the court and counsel in the Deep-
water Horizon case should be studied and adapted in future civil litigation.
In this way, governments from small to large can continue to ensure that
even the worst violators with the deepest pockets can be brought to justice
within a reasonable time.
